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IN DEFENSE OF THE SUBSTANCE–PROCEDURE DICHOTOMY
JENNIFER S. HENDRICKS†
Abstract
John Hart Ely famously observed, “We were all brought up on
sophisticated talk about the fluidity of the line between substance and
procedure,” but for most of Erie’s history, the Supreme Court has
answered the question “Does this state law govern in federal court?”
with a “yes” or a “no.” Beginning, however, with Gasperini v.
Center for Humanities, and continuing with Semtek v. Lockheed and
the dissenting opinion in Shady Grove v. Allstate, a shifting coalition
of justices has pursued a third path. Instead of declaring state law
applicable or inapplicable, they have claimed for themselves the
prerogative to fashion law that purportedly accommodates the
interests of both sovereigns. With the cover of an intellectual critique
of the substance–procedure dichotomy, the Court has thus embarked
on a new phase of Erie doctrine, a phase that replaces “yes” or “no”
with “Let’s see what we can work out.”
This Article adds a new level of critique to the chorus of criticism
that has already been directed at these opinions. It argues that the
new enterprise and its blurring of the substance–procedure
dichotomy are based on a misguided aspiration to accommodate state
substantive policies at the expense of federal procedure.
Descriptively, in order to have a dichotomy, it is necessary to
have two poles. This Article therefore demonstrates that the
distinction between substance and procedure is appropriately
represented by a single-dimensional spectrum. Part of what the Court
has done wrong is to ignore this linear relationship by insisting, for
†Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. For generously
taking the time to give helpful feedback on an earlier draft of this Article, thanks
are due to Steve Burbank, Sergio Campos, Kevin Clermont, Robert Condlin, Judy
Cornett, Thomas Main, Martin Redish, Tom Rowe, Jay Tidmarsh, and Patrick
Woolley. Thanks also to Jamelle Sharpe and the University of Illinois College of
Law for hosting the Junior Faculty Federal Courts Workshop at which this Article
received helpful comments from Scott Dodson, Charlton Copeland, Tara Grove,
Sam Jordan, Abbe Gluck, Matthew Hall, Lumen Mulligan, and others; and to the
participants in the junior faculty workshop hosted at the Washington University
School of Law by Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff.
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example, in Semtek, that res judicata is “too substantive” to be
addressed in the Federal Rules yet procedural enough to be governed
by federal common law under the Rules of Decision Act. In addition,
given the linearity of substance and procedure, one could imagine the
distinction either as a dichotomy of black and white, with every legal
rule falling into one category or the other, or as a spectrum of gray,
with many or even most legal rules falling in the mushy middle.
Descriptively, of course, the latter view is more accurate. This
Article argues, however, that the Court should nevertheless classify
each one as black or white, rather than attempt to accommodate both
its procedural and its substantive aspects.
This Article offers two reasons for preferring the black–white
approach. First, the governing statutes contemplate a dichotomy
between substance and procedure, and the Court is not authorized to
use the ambiguity in that distinction to replace the statutory scheme
with its own discretionary treatment of state law. Second, eschewing
Phase Three and returning to the black–white approach would
promote democratic transparency in the states. Specifically, in
addition to traditional Erie concerns about judicial lawmaking,
Congress has set a policy of establishing a uniform body of transsubstantive procedural law. State legislators know this, and there is
nothing wrong with federal courts expecting them to act accordingly.
If they, as Representative Dingell famously offered, prefer to
manipulate procedure in order to undermine the substantive rights
they purport to have created, the threat of fixed procedures in
diversity could and should restrain them. Too often, the Supreme
Court treats legislative enactments as fixed, so that the game begins
when the litigants start their forum shopping. The game begins
earlier, in the legislature, and the Court’s ad hoc, accommodating
approach to state law in Erie’s third phase creates the wrong
incentives for that game.
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In the last fifteen years, the Supreme Court has been taking
legal realism a bit too seriously. “We were all brought up on
sophisticated talk about the fluidity of the line between substance
and procedure,”1 but for many years, when presented with a
thorny problem of vertical choice of law, the Supreme Court
hemmed and hawed about the subtleness of the distinction—and
picked one. Ultimately, a decision had to be made; either the
federal courts would follow a particular state law in diversity
cases or they would not.
In the First Phase of Erie,2 state law was ascendant and usually
deemed binding.3 In the Second Phase, after Hanna v. Plumer,4 the
Federal Rules reigned supreme, sweeping aside state laws in or near
their path.5 In both phases, the Supreme Court’s decisions sometimes
strained credulity. They did, however, perform the function of
answering the question “Does this state law govern in federal court?”
with a “yes” or a “no.” Beginning with Gasperini v. Center for
Humanities,6 however, a shifting coalition of justices has pursued a
third path, declaring state law neither wholly applicable nor wholly
inapplicable. Instead, they have claimed for themselves the
prerogative to fashion law that purportedly accommodates the
interests of both sovereigns.7 With the cover of an intellectual
critique of the substance-procedure dichotomy, this new approach
represents a nascent Third Phase of the Erie doctrine, which would
replace “yes” or “no” with “Let’s see what we can work out.”
This new venture—so far, Gasperini, Semtek,8 and, most
recently, four or five justices in Shady Grove9—has been the object
1

John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 724 (1974).
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3
See infra, Part I.A.
4
380 U.S. 460 (1965).
5
See infra, Part I.B. An exception during this Phase was Walker v. Armco Steel
Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980), which adhered to a prior Phase One decision deferring
to state law. See infra, note 67.
6
518 U.S. 415 (1996).
7
See infra, Part I.C.
8
Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
2
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of “a chorus of academic criticism.”10 Most of this criticism focuses
on problems of administrability, lack of adequate guidance to lower
courts, and the continuing absurdity of reading a Federal Rule to
mean one thing in federal cases and another in diversity.11
This Article adds a new level of critique. It argues that the
Phase-Three approach and its blurring of the substance–procedure
dichotomy are inappropriate uses of federal judicial power and are
based on a misguided aspiration to accommodate state substantive
policies at the expense of federal procedure. This thesis includes both
a descriptive and a prescriptive claim.
Descriptively, in order to have a dichotomy, it is necessary to
have two poles. This Article therefore demonstrates that the
distinction between substance and procedure is appropriately
represented by a single-dimensional spectrum. That is, even though
there are several different ways of making the distinction—the Rules
of Decision Act (“RDA”) approach,12 the Rules Enabling Act
(“REA”) approach,13 the inherent powers approach14—the tests for
9

Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Insur. Co., _ U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 1431
(2010). The four dissenters in Shady Grove used a Phase-Three approach, while
the lead opinion, joined in full by four justices, used an aggressive version of the
Phase-Two approach. Justice Stevens joined parts of the lead opinion and wrote a
separate concurrence that appeared to agree with the dissenters’ approach in at
least some respects, despite reaching a different conclusion. See infra, Part I.C.3.
10
Earl C. Dudley & George Rutherglen, Deforming the Federal Rules: An Essay
On What’s Wrong With the Recent Erie Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 707, 708
(2006).
11
See infra, part II.A. The Supreme Court has explicitly adopted separate
interpretations of Rule 3 for diversity cases and federal question cases. See Ragan
v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533 (1949) (in a diversity
case, disregarding the potential applicability of Rule 3); Walker v. Armco Steel
Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980) (adhering to Ragan); West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39
(1987) (holding in a federal question case that Rule 3 determines commencement
of an action for purposes of the statute of limitations). In Semtek and Shady Grove,
the Court and the dissenters (respectively) adopted novel interpretations of Rules
41(b) and 23 (respectively) for diversity cases which have yet to affect how those
Rules are applied in federal question cases. See infra, notes 127-28 and
accompanying text.
12
Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
13
Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
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each of these approaches can be understood as marking different
points along the same linear continuum. With pure substance at one
end and pure procedure at the other, all legal rules can be thought of
as lying at some point between these two poles. Part of what the
Court has done wrong is to ignore this linear relationship by
insisting, for example, in Semtek, that res judicata is “too
substantive” to be addressed in the Federal Rules yet procedural
enough to be governed by federal common law under the RDA.15
Normatively, this Article defends the dichotomy between
substance and procedure. Given the linearity of substance and
procedure, one could imagine the distinction either as a dichotomy of
black and white, with every legal rule falling into one category or the
other, or as a spectrum of gray, with many or even most legal rules
falling in the mushy middle. Descriptively, of course, the latter view
is more accurate. This Article claims, however, that the Court should,
with full awareness of the grayness of all things, nevertheless
classify each one as black or white, rather than attempt to
accommodate both its procedural and its substantive aspects. The
classification need not be the same for all purposes and in all
contexts. The Court has good reasons for drawing the line between
substance and procedure differently under the RDA, under the REA,
and in other contexts.16 Within each context, however, a particular
legal rule should be classified as either black or white: either
substantive or procedural, governed by either federal or state law.
This Article offers two reasons for preferring the black–white
approach. First, the governing statutes contemplate a dichotomy
between substance and procedure, and the Court is not authorized to
use the ambiguity in that distinction to replace the statutory scheme
with its own discretionary treatment of state law. In the face of an
already delicate choice between state and federal law, trying to create
14

See Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813 (2008)
(describing and developing a theory for explaining the federal courts’ inherent
powers over procedure).
15
See infra part II.B.1.
16
But see Jay Tidmarsh, Procedure, Substance, and Erie (draft on file with the
author) (arguing that the distinction between substance and procedure should not
vary across contexts).
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nuanced accommodations between the two allows the perfect to
become the enemy of the good. The Phase-Three approach may be
feasible in the Supreme Court or in scholarly articles, but it does not
produce good doctrine on the ground.
Second, eschewing Phase Three and returning to the black–
white approach would promote democratic transparency in the states.
Specifically, in addition to traditional Erie concerns about judicial
lawmaking, Congress has set a policy of establishing a uniform body
of trans-substantive procedural law.17 State lawmakers know this,
and there is nothing wrong with federal courts expecting them to act
accordingly. If they, as Representative Dingell famously offered,18
prefer to manipulate procedure in order to undermine the substantive
rights they purport to have created, the threat of fixed procedures in
diversity could and should restrain them. Too often, the Supreme
Court treats legislative enactments as fixed, so that the game begins
when the litigants start their forum shopping. The game begins
earlier, in the legislature, and the Court’s ad hoc, accommodating
approach to state law in Erie’s third phase creates the wrong
incentives for that game.
Part I of this Article describes Erie’s three phases and identifies
a key characteristic of each phase’s treatment of the relationship
between state law and the Federal Rules. For those readers fortunate
enough to have escaped law school before the Phase-Three approach
emerged, part I.C describes Gasperini, Semtek, and Shady Grove in
detail. It shows that while the First Phase was characterized by
deference to state policy and the Second Phase by the ascendency of
the Federal Rules, the nascent Third Phase is characterized by
judicial discretion in formulating the law that controls in diversity
17

See infra, text accompanying notes 229-32. Of course, Congress itself retains the
prerogative to adopt special procedures in particular substantive contexts. This
prerogative troubles some scholars, see infra part II.C.2, but its resolution is
beyond the scope of this Article.
18
“I’ll let you write the substance ... you let me write the procedure, and I’ll screw
you every time.” Regulatory Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 2327 Before the
Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Regulations of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 312 (1983) (statement of Rep. John Dingell).
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cases. Part II.A argues that courts lack authority for exercising this
discretion: the Phase-Three approach presents itself as creative
problem-solving that crafts accommodations to serve state and
federal interests; the proper role of the courts in this context is more
limited. Part II.B argues that the Phase-Three approach also
undermines separation of powers principles at the state level. The
justices using this approach have justified it by the purported need to
vindicate state policy choices. However, state-level democracy
would be better served by forcing state lawmakers to enact their
policy choices into substantive law, rather than allowing them to
manipulate outcomes through procedure.19 One way to encourage
them to do so is to adhere to a uniform system of federal procedure,
rather than modifying procedure on an ad hoc basis as the Court did
in Gasperini and Semtek. Thus, the justification for the Phase-Three
approach in Gasperini and Semtek —the need to protect state
lawmaking prerogatives—is misguided. Part III offers suggestions
for minimizing the damage of those two cases: confining them to
their facts and retaining to the conceptual structure of Phase Two.
I. THE THREE PHASES OF ERIE
Vertical choice of law doctrine has developed in three stages
since Erie was decided. In Phase One, the Supreme Court held that
most state laws it encountered were “substantive” for purposes of the
RDA.20 In Phase Two, the Court reversed course, holding that most
things were not only procedural but also already covered by federal
law.21 The Federal Rules fared poorly in Phase One, while state law
19

As noted above, “substance” and “procedure” are fluid categories and are
inextricably intertwined. They are, nonetheless, “the terms the Enabling Act Uses,”
Ely, supra note 1, at 724, and the existence of dawn and dusk does not negate the
difference between night and day. The question is what to do when the cases of
dawn and dusk arise. This article proposes that we judge the Federal Rules
according to the terms o the REA and call that realm of federal law “procedural”
and thus applicable in diversity cases. Everything else is, in this context,
“substantive,” which leaves plenty of room for state lawmakers to carry out their
policies. This Article is agnostic on whether the current approach to assessing the
validity of the Rules under the REA is adequate.
20
See infra, Part I.A.
21
See infra, Part I.B.
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fared poorly in Phase Two. In both of these phases, however, the
Court honored the need to choose: state law either did or did not
apply.
The Phase-Three approach strikes out in a new direction.22 It
began, in Gasperini, with the long-acknowledged observation that
substance and procedure are inextricably intertwined.23 A law that on
its face regulates procedure may be intended to serve a substantive
policy. In Phases One and Two, this reality meant that the decision
whether to apply state law was often difficult. In Phase Three, the
justices using the new approach have taken the initiative to craft
compromises that accommodate state policy while retaining federal
control. The nascent Third Phase is thus characterized by the federal
courts exercising discretionary authority over whether and how to
accommodate what they perceive to be state policy preferences
expressed in state procedural law.
A. Phase One: Deference to the States
The Supreme Court held in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins24 that the
Rules of Decision Act requires a federal court sitting in diversity25 to
apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits.26 In the
standard telling of the story, the reasons for the decision were both
jurisprudential and political. Jurisprudentially, legal realism and
22

See infra, Part I.C.
See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 426 (1996).
24
304 U.S. 64.
25
State substantive law may apply in federal court in contexts other than diversity
jurisdiction, such as when a state law claim is litigated under the supplemental
jurisdiction granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1367. For the sake of convenience, this Article
follows the common practice of referring to Erie questions as arising primarily in
diversity cases.
26
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. More precisely, federal courts must follow state law “rules
of decision,”28 U.S.C. § 1652, a requirement that in retrospect has been
understood as drawing a distinction that maps, at least approximately, onto the
concepts of “substance” and “procedure.” Before Erie, federal courts sitting in
diversity routinely applied state statutes and state common-law rules that were
understood to be “local,” but under the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1
(1842), they followed their own lights on questions of general common law.
23
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positivism had swept aside belief in a single, universal common law
that could be discovered by state and federal courts alike.27
Politically, the old guard in the federal courts was adhering to
common law doctrines—especially doctrines that hindered tort
plaintiffs—that in state courts were giving way to the demands of
new social realities in the wake of the industrial revolution.28 The
Erie doctrine restricted the power of the federal diversity courts over
substantive law, confining them to the task of providing an
alternative forum for enforcing legal rights that are created and
defined by the states.
Justice Reed, concurring in Erie, was the first to anticipate what
would become the central meaning of Erie to future generations: the
distinction between substance and procedure. He observed, “The line
27

See Edward A. Purcell, The Story of Erie: How Litigants, Lawyers, Judges,
Politics, and Social Change Reshape Law, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES at 23-24
(Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2004) (describing the pre-Erie “declaratory” theory of
law); HOWARD FINK & MARK TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY AND
PRACTICE 190 (2d ed. 1987).
28
See Purcell, supra note 27, at 25 (“[Before Erie], the federal courts were
becoming identified with the new national economy and the protection of corporate
rights, and their ‘general’ law decisions spread from commercial issues into most
common-law fields and seemed to grow ever more favorable to corporate
interests.”); JoEllen Lind, “Procedural Swift”: Complex Litigation Reform, State
Tort Law, and Democratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REV. 717, 732 (2004) (“According
to some commentators, Swift [v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1941),] secured the federal
courts as ‘business courts’ used by corporations to resist the claims of workers
seeking redress for injuries.”); Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine?
(And What Does It Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?),
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 248 (2008) (“Justice Brandeis’ ruling in Erie
restrained a pro-corporate federal judiciary by eliminating its power to create
substantive rules of federal common law, which had operated to displace state rules
that were often less favorable to corporate litigants.”). Given this historical context,
it was ironic and perhaps politically convenient for the Court that in Erie itself
state law favored the corporate defendant. A similar reversal of typical interests
occurred in Shady Grove and may partly explain the alignment of liberal and
conservative justices in that case. See Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action
Federalism: Erie and the Rules Enabling Act After Shady Grove, _ NOTRE DAME
L. REV. _, 44-45 (forthcoming 2011) (draft on file) (arguing that the justices in
Shady Grove may have been looking ahead to more typical cases, where
defendants prefer the application of federal class action law and plaintiffs prefer
state law).
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between procedural and substantive law is hazy but no one doubts
federal power over procedure.”29 Consistent with this point, Erie’s
First Phase was devoted primarily to developing a menu of tests for
distinguishing substance from procedure under the RDA.30 When a
litigant proposes that a particular state law should govern in a
diversity action, and no federal law or Rule supersedes the state law,
federal courts ask whether the matter is outcome-determinative in a
run of cases,31 a test which was later refined to focus on the “twin
aims” of Erie: avoiding inequitable outcomes and discouraging
forum shopping.32 If so, then state law should apply.33 Depending on
the circumstances, courts may also balance state interests and Erie
concerns against other federal interests that may favor the application
of federal law.34
29

Erie, 304 U.S. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result)
(citation omitted).
30
The Court at times refused to describe the distinction as one between substance
and procedure, perhaps wishing to retain those terms for marking the bounds of the
REA. See Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (“It is … immaterial
whether statutes of limitations are characterized either as ‘substantive’ or
‘procedural’ in State court opinions in any use of those terms unrelated to the
specific issue before us.”). This Article refers to both the REA and the RDA—and,
for that matter, the powers of Congress and the courts to regulate judicial
proceedings—as distinguishing between “substance” and “procedure,” while
recognizing that the dividing line is in a different place under each regime. I will
usually refer to matters as being either substantive or procedural “for purposes of
the REA [or the RDA, or inherent powers, or whatever].” For readers who prefer a
more prominent reminder that these labels are conclusory rather than inherent in
the matters discussed, I suggest globally replacing “substance” and “procedure”
with more clearly arbitrary terms, such as “Salt” and “Pepper,” or perhaps “matters
governed by state law” and “matters governed by federal law.”
31
Scholars have offered several formulations for determining when a rule of law is
outcome-determinative in a meaningful sense, rather than in the trivial sense that a
litigant who refuses to follow technical rules about, say, paper size will surely lose.
See, e.g., Tidmarsh, supra note 16 (proposing an ex ante valuation approach).
32
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-67 (1965).
33
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470.
34
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958). Byrd was the
only major case in the RDA line that refused to follow state law in Phase One,
concluding that federal practice, rather than state, determined the division of
responsibility between judge and jury in federal court. Byrd involved the potential
applicability of the Seventh Amendment, rather than a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure. Although the Court did not reach the question whether the Seventh
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Although Justice Reed’s comment in Erie could be read as
implicitly insisting that the brand-new Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure not be disregarded in diversity cases, the pattern that
emerged was one of avoiding or neglecting the Rules in cases that
came to the Court as “Erie cases.” For almost the next three decades,
the Court often bent over backwards to apply state law, holding that
state law governed even such plausibly procedural matters as statutes
of limitations, enforcement of arbitration clauses, and bond
requirements.35 For example, the Court showed great deference to
the states in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Company.36
The question in Ragan was whether the plaintiff had satisfied the
statute of limitations by filing the complaint in federal court.37
According to Federal Rule 3, an action is “commenced” as soon as it
is filed, which would seem to indicate that any limitations period
Amendment required the outcome, the Court made plain that it reasoned in the
shadow of the Seventh Amendment by introducing the concept of “countervailing
federal interests” into the Erie analysis. Confronted with a potential constitutional
command, the Court at last remembered that federal law is supreme; in this sense,
Byrd can be seen as a forerunner of the Second Phase. See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537539.
Scholars disagree about the continuing viability of Byrd. Some point out that the
Supreme Court has rarely cited it and has not expressly followed its framework.
See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Not Bad for Government Work: Does Anyone Else
Think the Supreme Court is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in Its Erie-Hanna
Jurisprudence?, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 963, 987 (1998) (criticizing scholars
who treat Byrd as the dominant framework). Others argue that despite the lack of
explicit citation, Byrd’s conceptual structure has influenced the Court’s analysis in
many cases and that it remains the best framework for approaching Erie questions.
See, e.g., Richard D. Freer and Thomas C. Arthur, The Irrepressible Influence of
Byrd, 20 CREIGHTON L. REV. _ (forthcoming 2011) (draft on file); Kevin M.
Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, _ NOTRE DAME L. REV. _, 13-14
(forthcoming 2011) (draft on file).
35
See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (length of statute of
limitations); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949)
(what action is needed to toll statute of limitations by initiating litigation); Cohen
v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (bond requirement);
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Amer., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (arbitration).
36
337 U.S. 530 (1949). Relying heavily on stare decisis, the Court reaffirmed the
outcome of Ragan in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749, 750-51
(1980) (stating that Rule 3’s definition of “commencement” was relevant to
internal court processes rather than to the statute of limitations).
37
Ragan, 337 U.S. at 531.
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stops running.38 State law, however, provided that an action was not
“commenced” until the summons had been served.39 The Supreme
Court acknowledged that federal courts treated Rule 3 as
authoritative on this question.40 The court nonetheless insisted that
local law must govern.41 In non-diversity cases, however, Rule 3
continued to be understood as defining commencement for
limitations purposes.42 In diversity cases it meant something
different. The characteristic feature of this First Phase was the
Court’s finding that almost all law was “substantive” and thus
controlled by the states, even to the point of disregarding a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure.43
B. Phase Two: The Imperial Rules
By apt coincidence, Erie was decided in 1938, the same year the
Supreme Court first promulgated uniform, trans-substantive Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure for use in federal courts, pursuant to the

38

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 3.
Ragan, 337 U.S. at 531 & n.4 (describing state law).
40
Ragan, 337 U.S. at 533 (citing Bomar v. Keyes, 62 F.2d 136, 141 (2d Cir.
1947)). This interpretation of Rule 3 was confirmed in West v. Conrail, 481 U.S.
35, 39 (1987) (“[W]e now hold that when the underlying cause of action is based
on federal law and the absence of an express federal statute of limitations makes it
necessary to borrow a limitations period from another statute, the action is not
barred if it has been ‘commenced’ in compliance with Rule 3 within the borrowed
period.”).
41
Ragan, 337 U.S. at 533.
42
See West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39 (1987).
43
See Scalise v. Beach Aircraft Corp., 47, F.R.D. 148, 150 (D. Del. 1969) (“Ragan
seemed to assert the supremacy of local law over Federal Rules in diversity cases
whenever local law would have barred the action had it been brought in a state
court.”). The dual-interpretation problem can be elided by treating the “federal”
version of each Federal Rule as a judicial gloss akin to common lawmaking. If that
gloss is “substantive” for RDA purposes, it must give way to a “state” version of
the Federal Rule in diversity cases. See Steinman, What Is Erie, supra note 28, at
282-87. However, this is not how the Supreme Court has framed its analysis in the
dual-interpretation cases. See Clermont, Repressible Myth, supra note 34, at 29
(stating that Shady Grove contradicted the predictions of this theory); comment by
Adam Steinman on civil procedure professors’ listserv, 4/3/10 (on file with
author).
39
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Rules Enabling Act of 1934.44 Alongside the developing Erie
doctrine distinguishing substance from procedure under the RDA, a
separate line of cases addressed the validity of particular Federal
Rules, under the mandate of the REA that the Rules govern
“procedure” and do not “modify or abridge substantive rights.”45 The
REA cases—most notably Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.46—adopted a
much broader understanding of the procedure category: to this day,
anything that “really regulates procedure” is valid territory for the
Federal Rules.47
During Phase One, the Supreme Court generally treated
RDA/Erie cases separately from REA cases. In Sibbach, for
example, a possible collision between the two statutes was avoided
by the plaintiff’s concession that the matter was “procedural.”48 By
such avoidance, the Phase-One deference to state law in Erie cases
was able to co-exist with Sibbach’s deferential posture toward the
Rules.
Sibbach and the REA collided with Erie and the RDA in Hanna
v. Plumer,49 which marks the beginning of Erie’s Second Phase.
Hanna recognized that if valid, controlling federal law dictated a
result, that law superseded any state law, under the Supremacy
Clause as well as under the language of the RDA.50 Unlike Ragan,
Hanna implicitly recognized that the Federal Rules are federal laws
like any other. They thus control whenever they validly apply.51
44

28 U.S.C. § 2072; Pub. L. No. 73-415, ch. 651, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
28 U.S.C. 2072.
46
312 U.S. 1 (1941).
47
See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Insur. Co., _ U.S. _, 130 S.Ct.
1431, 1444 (2010) (affirming that “really regulates procedure” remains the test
under the REA). See also Clermont, Repressible Myth, supra note 34, at 24
(arguing that eight justices assented to this conclusion in Shady Grove).
48
Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 10-11.
49
380 U.S. 460 (1965).
50
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472. The RDA explicitly exempts instances in which “the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress” apply and prevent
the application of state law. 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
51
See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473-74 (“To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
must cease to function whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights
45
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In Hanna, this issue played out on the question of service of
process. State law required personal service on the defendant, while
Federal Rule 4 offered options for substituted service.52 Under cases
like Ragan, the defendant had a plausible argument that the mode of
service constituted substantive state policy to which the federal court
should defer.53 Rule 4, however, was valid under the “really
regulates procedure” standard from Sibbach.54 It was therefore a
valid federal law that spoke directly to the question, and it trumped
state law.55
After Hanna, the Court once again swung to the extreme, this
time aggressively reading federal law to displace state law.56 The
zenith of this Phase is illustrated by a pair of Alabama cases. In one,
the plaintiff argued that a federal court sitting in diversity should
follow Alabama courts in refusing to enforce forum-selection
clauses.57 Such clauses were disfavored in Alabama.58 Although no
federal law requires that forum-selection clauses be enforced, the
Supreme Court held that the general change-of-venue statute covered

would be to disembowel either the Constitution’s grant of power over federal
procedure or Congress’ attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling Act.”).
52
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 463 (describing the differences between state and federal
requirements). Commentators have pointed out that the perceived incompatibility
between state and federal law could have been avoided. State law, like federal law,
allowed substituted service to initiate the case but required personal service to toll
the statute of limitations. Hanna thus appears inconsistent with Ragan not only as a
matter of theoretical approach but also in producing an irreconcilable outcome. Cf.
supra, note 43 and accompanying text.
53
See Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949)
(holding that state law determines when an action has “commenced,” for purposes
of tolling the statute of limitations). Because state law determines whether service
is required to toll the statute of limitations, it makes sense that state law would
determine how service must be performed.
54
See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464. Hanna did not discuss, but later Courts and
commentators have suggested, that a Rule could be generally valid under Sibbach
but invalid as-applied. See infra, text accompanying notes 110-24.
55
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464.
56
The one exception is Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980),
discussed infra, note 67.
57
Stewart Org. v. Ricoh, 487 U.S. 22, 24 (1988).
58
Stewart, 487 U.S. at 24.
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the territory and therefore superseded Alabama law.59 The other
Alabama case dealt with a state statute requiring defendants to pay
penalties for unsuccessful appeals.60 Again, no federal law appeared
directly on point. The Court, however, looked to provisions in the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure that deal with taxation of costs
on appeal.61 The Federal Rules gave judges discretion to tax costs on
appeal. In the Phase-Two enthusiasm for Federal Rules over state
law, these federal provisions were sufficient to cover the territory of
penalizing unsuccessful appeals, and therefore to justify disregarding
the state law.62 The Second Phase, then, was characterized by the
Court’s more aggressive use of federal procedural law to avoid
obligations to advance state policies.
After Hanna, it was also clear that there were two separate
standards for distinguishing substance from procedure. In what
Hanna called “unguided Erie” analysis,63 courts distinguish between
substance and procedure by using the twin aims of Erie in
combination with earlier precedents such as Guaranty Trust and
Byrd, which ask whether the rule is outcome-determinative, whether
it is bound up with substantive rights, and whether there are
countervailing federal interests.64 On the spectrum from substance to
procedure, these tests mark a dividing line somewhere in the midst of
an admittedly large gray area. In contrast, when the analysis is
“guided” by the existence of a Federal Rule on point, the Court is
much more strongly inclined to find that the matter is procedural.
59

Stewart, 487 U.S. at 28.
Burlington N. R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 3 (1987). The penalty was ten percent of
the judgment, plus costs on appeal.
61
Burlington, 480 U.S. at 4.
62
Burlington, 480 U.S. at 7. A court anxious to defer to state law could have
perceived a difference in purpose that would allow simultaneous application of the
state and federal laws. Taxation of costs alleviates a small portion of the financial
cost of litigation, while a ten percent surcharge on the judgment would usually be a
more substantial amount and appeared to be directed at abuse of the appellate
process as a delay tactic.
63
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
64
See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (outcomedetermination test); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 535
(1958) (Byrd balancing test).
60
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That is, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure get the benefit of the
doubt that they really are procedural. Thus, the dividing line created
by the REA is at a different point on the spectrum than the RDA line.
A state law that would be deemed “substantive” under unguided Erie
analysis might still be superseded by a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure.
For example, in Ragan, the Court concluded that the state’s rule
for how an action is “commenced” for statute of limitations purposes
is substantive under Erie.65 This conclusion followed naturally from
Guaranty Trust, which held that statutes of limitations were
themselves substantive.66 The federal court in Ragan was therefore
obliged to follow state practice and hold that a diversity action had
not been commenced until the summons had been served. After
Hanna, this case might have come out the other way. Rather than
apply Erie’s substance/procedure test, the Court could have applied
the REA test to Rule 3, which says that an action is “commenced”
when the complaint is filed. If the Rule was valid under the REA, it
would control even in diversity cases and there would be no need for
an unguided Erie analysis.67

65

Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533 (1949).
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945).
67
Again, the discussion in the text sets aside the possibility that the Rule is invalid
as-applied to displace a particular state law. See infra, text accompanying notes
110-24. Guaranty Trust, Ragan, and Hanna all deal with rules that affect a statute
of limitations. While it makes some sense for them all to come out the same way,
there has to be a dividing line somewhere in the gradual transition between
substance and procedure. Moreover, any discrepancy between Guaranty Trust and
reverse-Ragan is ameliorated by considering the purpose that “commencement” of
the action serves. The state law in Ragan required service before the end of the
limitations period, presumably so the defendant would receive notice within that
period. This approach is compatible with the fact that many state courts will allow
a complaint to languish for years without being served before it will be dismissed
for failure to prosecute. In federal court, however, service is generally required
within 120 days of filing, which would ameliorate the concerns that presumably
motivated the state law in Ragan. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 4(m). Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed Ragan after Hanna. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,
446 U.S. 740 (1980). Having already lived with the dual interpretation of Rule 3
for three decades, the court chose not to overrule Ragan.

66
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In the first two phases of Erie, the Court swung between two
poles, first favoring state law, then federal law, especially the Federal
Rules. What emerged, however, was a reasonably clear framework of
federal supremacy tempered by the federalism of the RDA—or at
least, it was reasonably clear after John Hart Ely explained it.68 In
addition, the first two phases shared one overriding feature: in every
case, the federal courts were told either to follow their normal federal
practices, even in diversity cases, or to apply a particular rule of state
law. In each case, the choice between these two options and the
content of the rule to be applied flowed directly from federal laws,
such as the REA, or from state laws, made binding on diversity
courts by virtue of the RDA.
C. Phase Three: A Third Way to Nowhere
After swinging once to each extreme—over-zealous deference
to state law, then aggressive implementation of the Federal Rules—
one would hope that the Supreme Court would retreat to a happy
medium. Instead, however, in Gasperini and Semtek, the Court
unveiled a new approach to vertical choice-of-law in which, instead
of choosing between state and federal practice, the Court made up its
own rule that conformed to neither.69 Then in Shady Grove, the
Court splintered: Four dissenters would have continued down the
new path, while a four-justice plurality rejected it.70 The ninth,
Justice Stevens, appeared to lean toward the dissenters’ theoretical
approach but disagreed with the application and so voted with the
plurality.71

68

See Ely, supra note 1. Note that this conceptual framework would be consistent
with a more rigorous approach to the REA’s limitations on the Federal Rules.
69
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (discussed infra, part
I.C.1); Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001) (discussed
infra, part I.C.2).
70
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Insur. Co., _ U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 1431
(2010) (discussed infra, Part I.C.3).
71
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
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Robert Condlin has observed that Gasperini is “the type of
precedent that, in retrospect, often turns out to be either the harbinger
of a new doctrinal order, or an analytical wild card never heard from
again.”72 Only time will tell “whether Gasperini becomes an integral
part of a new Erie/Hanna overview, or is forgotten as a doctrinal
frolic and detour.”73 Two decisions later, the outcome is still unclear,
especially because Justice Stevens, now retired, was the swing vote
in Shady Grove.74 This Article aims to demonstrate that the Court
should nip the Third Phase in its bud. Phase Three is characterized
by creative interpretation that constitutes inappropriate freelancing
by a Court that is supposed to be making a choice of law.
1. Gasperini v. Center for the Humanities
William Gasperini was a photographer who lent several hundred
of his transparencies to the Center for the Humanities.75 The Center
lost the negatives, and Gasperini sued for compensation. Sitting in
diversity, the federal jury awarded $450,000, and the trial judge
denied the Center’s motion to remit the verdict.76 On appeal, the
Center argued that the Second Circuit should review the
reasonableness of the verdict pursuant to a New York tort reform
statute.77 The statute directed intermediate courts of appeal to
determine whether a jury verdict “materially deviates from what
would be reasonable compensation.”78 The Center argued that this
statute reflected substantive policy in the State of New York. The
Rules of Decision Act therefore required the federal courts to follow
New York law in place of ordinary federal practice, in which
appellate review of jury verdicts is limited by historic practices under
72

Robert J. Condlin, “A Formstone of Our Federalism”: The Erie/Hanna Doctrine
and Casebook Law Reform, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 525 (2005).
73
Condlin, supra note 66, at 525.
74
Even the Shady Grove plurality, however, joined in the Phase-Three decision in
Semtek. Indeed, Justice Scalia authored both Semtek and the Shady Grove plurality
opinion.
75
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 419 (1996).
76
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 419-20.
77
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 421.
78
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 421 (quoting N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & Rules § 5501(c)).
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the common law. The Second Circuit agreed and ordered that the
verdict be reduced.79
In the Supreme Court, Gasperini argued that the New York
statute conflicted with the Seventh Amendment.80 The Supreme
Court appeared to agree, ruling that federal appellate courts cannot
apply the New York standard.81 Under prior doctrine, that would
have been the end of the matter. Because there is valid federal law on
point, it preempts the state statute; federal courts obviously cannot
rely on the RDA as grounds for ignoring the Seventh Amendment.
Indeed, in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electric, the mere shadow of the
Seventh Amendment was enough to push the Court to declare the
division of labor between judge and jury to be a matter of procedure,
governed by federal law even in diversity cases.82
In Gasperini, however, the Court, did not stop there. Although it
adhered to its view that federal law controlled, it changed federal law
by inventing a new procedure to accommodate what it saw as New
York’s substantive concerns. Although the Seventh Amendment
barred the Court of Appeals from reviewing the reasonableness of
the jury verdict, the Court held that the trial court could perform that
review, under the standard set by the statute.83 The result was “a
pastiche of federal and state law, but neither the one nor the other.”84
79

Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 421.
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426. The Gasperini dissent also argued that the New
York law was displaced by Federal Rule 59. The majority responded to this
argument in a footnote, indicating that the majority disagreed with Justice Scalia
about the scope of the Rules. For purposes of this Article, issues involving the
applicability of a Federal Rule are adequately presented by Semtek and Shady
Grove, so I follow the Court in passing lightly over that issue in Gasperini. See
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 467-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 438, n. 22 (majority
response).
81
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 439.
82
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 539 (1958) (stating that the
Court’s decision was made “under the influence—if not the command—of the
Seventh Amendment” and noting in a footnote that the Court was not deciding the
Seventh Amendment question).
83
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 436. The preceding paragraphs describe the New York
law at issue as it is described in the opening paragraph of Gasperini and as it has
generally been treated in commentary on that case. A more precise description of
80
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2. Semtek v. Lockheed
Semtek also involved the Court’s crafting a federal alternative
rather than simply choosing state law or ordinary federal practice.
Semtek is a confusing case, in part because of the knotty procedural
problem at its center: the claim-preclusive effect of a dismissal for
failure to meet the statute of limitations.85 When a state court issues
such a dismissal, state law governs the preclusive consequences.86 In
California, where Semtek started, statute of limitations dismissals are
not preclusive, so the plaintiff remains free to re-file in a state with a
more generous limitations period.87 The extra twist was that the
dismissal in Semtek was by a federal court sitting in diversity. In
federal court, statute of limitations dismissals are usually
preclusive.88
The Supreme Court first asked whether the usual federal
practice was controlling. Lockheed argued that the case was
governed by Rule 41(b), which states:
Involuntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof. … Unless the
court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a
dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not
provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party
under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.89
New York law, and a discussion of the ramifications of that description, can be
found infra, part III.C.
84
Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 707.
85
Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 (2001) (“This
case presents the question whether the claim preclusive effect of a federal
judgment dismissing a diversity action on statute-of-limitations grounds is
determined by the law of the State in which the federal court sits.”).
86
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (“[J]udicial proceedings … shall have the same full faith and
credit in every court within the United States … as they have by law or usage in
courts of such State … from which they are taken.”); Marrese v. Amer. Acad. of
Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985).
87
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 499.
88
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 500.
89
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 41(b).

HENDRICKS, IN DEFENSE OF THE SUBSTANCE–PROCEDURE DICHOTOMY

22

Before Semtek, this Rule was widely understood to instruct that all
dismissals other than those listed can be claim preclusive as a matter
of federal law.90 In Semtek, however, the Court continued the
unfortunate practice, begun in Ragan, of reading a Federal Rule to
mean something different in diversity cases than in federal question
cases. Rule 41(b), said the Court, does not speak to claim preclusion
at all. Rather, it merely bars the plaintiff from re-filing the case in the
same court.91 The Court’s stated reason for this implausible reading
of Rule 41(b) was the fear that the Rule as written was too
substantive. That is, the Court suggested that the natural reading of
the Rule might run afoul of the REA because it would modify or
abridge the substantive right to bring the claim.92
Having disposed of Rule 41(b), the Court was left with an
unguided Erie choice: should it deem this matter substantive and
apply state law or procedural and governed by some federal law?
The twin aims of Erie favored applying state law.93 Moreover, the
Court had just suggested that the preclusion question was “too
substantive” to be covered by the Federal Rules. Nonetheless, the
Court insisted that federal law must control the preclusive effects of
diversity judgments. The stated reason for this insistence was
concern for the federal courts’ ability to use dismissal of a case as a
sanction.94 What if, posited the Court, a state did not recognize such
a dismissal as preclusive? As discussed below, this concern was a red
90

See Michael J. Edney, Preclusive Abstention: Issue Preclusion and
Jurisdictional Dismissals After Ruhrgas, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 193, 205 (2001)
(“Rule 41(b) directly addresses the preclusive effect of a dismissal before a full
trial on the merits ….”); Patrick Woolley, The Sources of Federal Preclusion Law
After Semtek, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 527, 577 (2003) (“It is not surprising that [Rule
41] was the only Federal Rule that was understood to expressly address preclusion
prior to Semtek.”); Stephen B. Burbank, Semtek, Forum Shopping, and Federal
Common Law, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1045-46 (2002) (concluding based
on the history of Rule 41’s drafting that the Rule was intended to govern only
eligibility for preclusion).
91
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 505.
92
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 506; see Clermont, Repressible Myth, supra note 34, at 21
(calling the Semtek interpretation of Rule 41(b) “strangely narrow”).
93
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508.
94
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508.

HENDRICKS, IN DEFENSE OF THE SUBSTANCE–PROCEDURE DICHOTOMY

23

herring.95 For the Court, however, it was the justification for
declaring that the Court itself had inherent power over a matter it had
just deemed too substantive for a Federal Rule.
In a final twist, the Court reverted to Erie principles to decide
what the federal common law rule should be.96 Rather than choose a
uniform rule of federal law, the Court held that federal common law
would borrow the rule of the forum state unless, on a case-by-case
basis, there was an important federal reason to choose a different
rule.97
3. Shady Grove v. Allstate
The most recent installment of the Third Phase is Shady Grove
v. Allstate.98 At issue in Shady Grove was another, earlier New York
tort reform statute. This one prohibits class actions to recover
“penalties,” such as statutory interest.99 The New York statute
conflicts with the ordinary understanding of Rule 23, which sets the
conditions under which class actions are appropriate in federal
court.100

95

See infra, text accompanying notes 163-66.
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508-09 (“[A]ny other rule would produce the sort of ‘forumshopping … and … inequitable administration of the laws’ that Erie seeks to
avoid.”) (quoting Hanna).
97
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508-09. This rule is reminiscent of Byrd, in which a matter
otherwise governed by state law under the RDA can be governed by federal law if
there is a countervailing federal interest. The difference is that Byrd acknowledged
an obligation to follow state law in the absence of such a federal interest, while the
Semtek Court followed state law as a matter of federal judicial discretion.
98
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Insur. Co., _ U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 1431
(2010).
99
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1436 (discussing N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. § 901). The
prohibition on penalty class actions was enacted as part of a general revision of
New York class action law in response to the adoption of Rule 23. See Stephen B.
Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of
Shady Grove, _ UNIV. OF PENN. L. REV. _, 22 (forthcoming 2011). It reflected
concerns that penalty class actions lead to over-enforcement. Id. at 70.
100
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1435; see Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23. Since its adoption
and despite academic objections, Rule 23 has routinely been applied to class
96
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Allstate, seeking to avoid a $5,000,000 class action in federal
court when the lead plaintiff would only be entitled to $500, argued
that Rule 23 should be read more finely.101 Justice Ginsberg, writing
for the four dissenters, followed the path of Ragan, agreeing with
Allstate that Rule 23 should be read to come into play only if the
substantive law itself authorized class actions.102 Justice Ginsburg
did not pretend that this reading of Rule 23 was natural. Rather, she
argued that courts should consciously read the Rule to avoid conflict
with the state’s substantive policy goals: they should “interpret the
Federal Rules in light of a State’s regulatory policy.”103
The plurality, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, rejected this
argument that an individual state’s policy should influence the
interpretation of federal law.104 Justice Scalia wrote that Rule 23
should be given its natural meaning as long as that meaning is valid
under the REA.105 Adhering to Sibbach’s standard as a full statement
of the REA’s limitations, he maintained that as long as a Rule “really
regulates procedure” in a general sense, it trumps any conflicting
state law, regardless of whether the state enacted the law for
substantive policy purposes rather than procedural ones.106 Justice
Stevens, the fifth vote for rejecting the application of state law in
Shady Grove itself, wrote separately to hold out the possibility that a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure could be invalid as applied in a rare
case.107 A Rule that, in general, “really regulates procedure” might
create such a disruption in state substantive policy that it would be
invalid for abridging, enlarging, or modifying a substantive right.108

certifications without a prior determination that the underlying substantive law
authorizes class recovery.
101
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1437.
102
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1468 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
103
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1468-69 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
104
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1440-41.
105
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1442.
106
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1444-45.
107
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1451 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
108
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1453-54 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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However, Justice Stevens concluded that Shady Grovewas not such a
case, so he voted not to apply the state law.109
The split in Shady Grove highlights an important debate over
how to determine the validity of Federal Rules. The current test is
that a Rule is valid if it “really regulates procedure.”110 This generous
standard comes from subpart (a) of the REA, which authorizes
regulation of “practice and procedure and rules of evidence.”111
Academics have long bemoaned the Supreme Court’s neglect of
subpart (b), which many interpret as an independent limit on the
Rules.112 That is, even a Rule that “really regulates procedure” might
be invalid if it also “abridge[s], enlarage[s], or modif[ies] any
substantive right.”113 Shady Grove exposed a split between those
who would apply subpart (b) on a case-by-case, “retail” basis and
those who would determine the validity of Federal Rules strictly at
the “wholesale” level.114
Justice Scalia’s plurality in Shady Grove took the “wholesale”
approach. Rule 23 was evaluated on its own terms and was found to
be targeted at the regulation of procedure.115 While the plurality
109

Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
110
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1445.
111
28 U.S.C. § 2072(a).
112
See, e.g., Ely, supra note 1, at 719-20; Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive
Rights” (in the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47,
48 (1998) (collecting citations); see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling
Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1108 (1982) (arguing that § 2072(b) does
not have independent effect distinct from the effect of § 2072(a) but that both
reflect more substantial limitations on the courts than current doctrine
acknowledges).
113
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
114
In addition to the Shady Grove opinions, compare Ely, supra note 1, at 733-34
(advocating case-by-case determination of whether a state’s interest in its laws is
substantive or procedural) with Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 727 (“The
cautionary example of what has happened in the related field of conflicts of laws,
where case-by-case balancing of interests has threatened to destabilize the entire
field, should lead the Supreme Court to reinforce rather than retreat from a uniform
interpretation of general rules of procedure.”).
115
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1444.
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inquired in a general sense whether the Rule regulated substantive
matters, it did so without reference to the particular state law at
issue.116 As it happens, the plurality’s assessment of Rule 23 was
especially deferential, even simplistic. The opinion characterized
class treatment as merely a matter of joinder,117 disregarding
powerful arguments to the contrary. One need not, however, take
such a deferential approach to the Rules in order to analyze the
validity of a Rule “wholesale.” One could adopt a more rigorous
approach to the REA’s limitations and still apply them wholesale.
The key to the wholesale approach is that it hinges on the substantive
or procedural nature of the Rule itself, without regard to the state law
that the Rule displaces.118
The Shady Grove dissent, and to a lesser extent Justice Stevens,
would determine the validity of the Federal Rule, as applied, with
reference to the state law.119 If the state law is understood to serve
substantive aims but uses a procedural mechanism to achieve them,
the Federal Rule may have to give way.120 For example, John Hart
Ely explained that whether a state prohibition on court-ordered
medical exams applied in federal court would depend on the reason
for the state ban.121 If the ban was part of a general scheme of limited
discovery, it would be deemed procedural and thus trumped by the
federal practice.122 If, however, the state enacted the ban as
substantive protection for the right to personal privacy, federal courts
would have to honor it in diversity cases.123 In Shady Grove, the
dissent argued that the state’s restriction on class actions served the
substantive goal of limiting liability under penalty clauses and was
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Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1444.
See Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1443.
118
See Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1444.
119
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 1451 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
120
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 1452 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
121
Ely, supra note 1 at 733-34 (using the facts of Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312
U.S. 1 (1941)).
122
Ely, supra note 1 at 734.
123
Ely, supra note 1 at 734.
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thus inapplicable in the particular circumstances of the case, even if
Rule 23 is generally valid as a regulation of procedure.124
The retail side of the wholesale/retail debate is the first step
toward the discretionary approach that characterizes Phase Three. In
Shady Grove, the dissent would have adopted an ad hoc
interpretation of Rule 23 designed to accommodate a particular state
law. This form of accommodation is a step away from Gasperini and
Semtek, in which the Court created its own procedures that combined
elements of state and federal law. The degree of judicial discretion is
greater in the latter two cases, but the willingness to strain federal
law is the same and is still in keeping with Phase Three.
II. WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE THIRD WAY
Gasperini and Semtek have been extensively analyzed and criticized,
and the same fate surely awaits Shady Grove. The divide between the
plurality and the dissent in Shady Grove presents a stark choice between
continuing the Phase-Three approach begun in Gasperini and Semtek or
returning to something like the conceptual structure of Phase Two. Part
II.B, below, argues that the judicial discretion that characterizes Phase
Three is unwarranted. Part II.C refutes the primary theoretical justification
for that discretion: While the Court has adopted a pose of vindicating
federalism by accommodating state policies, the Phase-Three approach is
neither required nor even necessarily helpful for protecting the results of
democratic processes in the states.
A. The Chorus of Criticism
The nascent Third Phase represented by Gasperini and Semtek (and
embraced by the Shady Grove dissent) has been criticized from several
quarters for being confusing and for failing to give adequate guidance to
the lower courts.125 Kevin Clermont offers mild praise for the Shady
124

Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1468 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See Rowe, supra note 34, at 963-66 (summarizing criticism of Gasperini and
defending the decision); Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 708 (describing a
“chorus of academic criticism” for Gasperini and Semtek); see also Geoffrey C.
125

HENDRICKS, IN DEFENSE OF THE SUBSTANCE–PROCEDURE DICHOTOMY

28

Grove plurality for bringing greater clarity to Erie doctrine while backing
off from what I am calling the Phase-Three approach.126 The most
common specific complaint about Semtek and the Shady Grove dissent is
their return to the practice of creating dual readings for Federal Rules:
Semtek and the Shady Grove dissent both accepted strained, implausible
interpretations of Federal Rules to be used only in diversity cases, with the
more natural interpretation continuing to prevail in federal question
cases.127 The creative textualism of Semtek’s Rule 41 and the Shady Grove
dissent’s Rule 23 is perhaps to be admired as a matter of lawyerly
semantic skill, but it should not be embraced by courts.128
Commentators have also noted that the ad hoc approach of the
Third Phase is in tension with Erie itself. Earl Dudley and George
Rutherglen observe that “federal district courts today arguably
possess greater freedom to reach desired results in diversity cases
than they had under Swift v. Tyson.”129 Douglas Floyd similarly
complains that Gasperini’s open-ended interest balancing will lead to
“unwarranted subordination of substantive state objectives to ad hoc
judicial perceptions of amorphous federal procedural ‘interests.’”130
Hazard, Has the Erie Doctrine Been Repealed by Congress?, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1629, 1635 (2008) (calling Gasperini “pitiful”).
126
Clermont, Repressible Myth, supra note 34.
127
See, e.g., Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 708-09 (summarizing the
authors’ criticisms of Gasperini and Semtek); J. Benjamin King, Clarification and
Disruption: The Effect of Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc. on the Erie
Doctrine, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 161, 164 (1997) (arguing that Gasperini
undermines reliance on apparently applicable Federal Rules).
128
One reason for rejecting such unnatural readings in order to reach a result in a
particular case is that potential for unforeseen consequences in other cases is
substantial. For example, the Shady Grove dissent would separate the “substantive”
question of whether class remedies are available on a particular cause of action
from the “procedural” questions addressed by Rule 23. While perhaps a clever
resolution of the case before it, such a holding would have opened the door to
litigation over whether class remedies are “available” as to every cause of action,
effectively creating a whole new field of law. See comment by Edward A. Hartnett
on civil procedure professors’ listserv, 3/31/10 (on file with author).
129
Dudley-Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 744-45. Interestingly, the lower courts do
not seem as interested in exercising this freedom as does the Supreme Court. See
infra, Part III.A.
130
C. Douglas Floyd, Erie Awry: A Comment on Gasperini v. Center for
Humanities, Inc., 1997 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 267, 269-70.
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Other commentators have praised both Gasperini and Semtek.
Stephen Burbank claims responsibility for most of Semtek, although he
parts ways with the Court over its strained reading of Rule 41(b),
suggesting that the Rule should simply have been held invalid.131 Praise
for Gasperini has come from those, like Thomas Rowe and Richard Freer,
who applaud the effort to accommodate state law and to give independent,
retail-level meaning to part (b) of the REA.132 Professor Freer, however, is
critical of the Court’s application Erie’s twin aims,133 and Professor
Rowe’s praise was in part contingent on the Court’s continued production
of solid majority opinions, a record that was broken by the splintered
decision in Shady Grove.134
This Article joins with the critics of the discretion exercised by the
Supreme Court in Gasperini and the dissent in Shady Grove. It adds, in
part II.B.1, that Semtek is of the same mold and, in part II.C, that
democracy in the states may actually be better served by abandoning the
Phase Three approach.
B. The Supreme Court Should Not Freelance on Choice-of-Law
Questions
This section argues that the Supreme Court’s freelancing on choiceof-law questions involves an unwarranted exercise of federal judicial
discretion. In Semtek, the Court announced that federal common law
would govern the preclusive effect of federal diversity judgments,
declining to apply either Rule 41 or state law. Under the terms of Semtek
itself, the Court’s authority for creating common law was suspect, and the
Court did not justify its claim of power. In Gasperini, the Court presented
itself as creatively seeking an accommodation of its own devising between
131

Burbank, Semtek and Forum Shopping, supra note 90, at 1039-47.
Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After Gasperini, 76 TEX.
L. REV. 1637 (1998); Rowe, supra note 125. Professor Rowe supports allowing
states to override Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on substantive policy grounds,
arguing that such overrides will be rare and could always be trumped by Congress.
133
Freer, supra note 132, at 1654-57.
134
Rowe, supra note 125, at 1014-15. Shady Grove also dashed Professor Rowe’s
hope that the Gasperini dissenters were driven primarily by Seventh Amendment
concerns and would join the rest of the Court’s deferential interpretive approach in
future cases.
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state and federal law, effectively creating a federal common law of New
York remedies. This, too, the Court failed to justify. In both cases, the
Court should have eschewed the freelancing that characterizes the Third
Phase.
1. The Trouble With Semtek: The Court’s Inherent Powers
Cannot Logically Exceed the Power of the Court and
Congress Acting Together.
Semtek’s reasoning is like a mobius strip. The question
presented starts out as a seemingly procedural one regarding the
effect of Federal Rule 41(b).135 But no, says the Court, the question
is substantive and therefore not reachable by the Federal Rules.136
Turn the page again, however, and it is once again procedural—at
least, procedural enough to be subject to the inherent powers of the
federal courts.137 If preclusion is “too substantive” to be regulated by
the Supreme Court and Congress acting together through the REA,
then the courts should not be able to regulate it pursuant to their
inherent power to regulate procedure.
The usual rule is that the preclusive effect of a judgment is
governed by the law of the court that rendered the judgment.138 This
rule allows the parties to make reasonable predictions of potential
135

Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 501 (2001).
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503-04.
137
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508. This is not to suggest that questions of preclusion must
be deemed inherently “substantive” or “procedural” for all purposes. The
distinction may be made differently under the RDA and the REA. However, as
discussed infra, this section, the inquiries under the two statutes are similar enough
that a matter deemed “substantive” for REA purposes (under the current, generous
standard, which is highly deferential to the Federal Rules) should also be deemed
“substantive” for RDA purposes (under the unguided Erie analysis, which favors
the “substantive” label and thus the application of state law). The difference
between the REA and the RDA tests lies in the realm that is considered procedural
in the sense that it may be governed by a federal Rule but, in the absence of a Rule,
would be governed by state law rather than federal practice.
138
See Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 MICH. L. REV. 945,
1002 (1998). Courts sometimes apply the preclusion law of the law-supplying
jurisdiction from the first case. Id. Either way, preclusive effects are predictable,
since they do not depend on the law of the enforcing jurisdiction.
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preclusive effects and to behave accordingly; it also vindicates the
procedural interests of the forum, which uses future preclusive
effects as tools for controlling the parties’ behavior over the course
of the litigation.139 Because the source of the law that will govern
future preclusive effects should be ascertainable at the time the first
judgment is rendered, we can imagine that every judgment contains
an invisible footnote specifying the preclusion law that applies. A
California judgment, for example, contains an invisible footnote
summarizing California preclusion law. When that judgment is
presented as a defense to litigation in a Maryland court, the Maryland
court applies the decisions embodied in the judgment and the
California rules of preclusion to the allegations made in the
Maryland action. From these elements, it determines whether the
Maryland action is precluded. The question in Semtek was: When a
federal court in California sits in diversity, does the invisible
footnote to its judgment contain California preclusion law or federal
preclusion law?
As described above, the defendant in Semtek first argued that
federal law controlled because Rule 41(b) made the federal judgment
preclusive.140 According to the first part of the opinion, however, the
Court adopted an implausible reading of Rule 41(b) because
preclusion was dangerously substantive, even for REA purposes.141
The Court warned that reading Rule 41(b) to govern preclusive effect
“would arguably violate the jurisdictional limitation of the Rules
Enabling Act: that the Rules ‘shall not abridge, enlarge or modify
any substantive right.’”142 This argument suggests that on the
spectrum from substance to procedure, the preclusion question in
Semtek falls on the “substance” side of the dividing line created by
the REA. Semtek’s justification for its narrow reading of Rule 41(b)
was that that preclusion is “too substantive” for the REA.143
139

See Erichson, supra note 138, at 1002-03.
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 501.
141
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503-04.
142
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 1026 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §2072(b)).
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One could read Semtek as addressing not preclusion generally but preclusive
effect in the context of statute of limitations dismissals. This reading is discussed
infra, text accompanying note part III.B, as an option for limiting Semtek’s effect,
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As discussed in Part I, the dividing line created by the REA is
different from the dividing line created by unguided Erie analysis
pursuant to the RDA. The REA line favors the application of federal
law, and thus favors the label “procedure.” The RDA line does the
opposite. The difference between the two is that some matters may
be “procedural” for REA purposes but “substantive” for RDA
purposes. Therefore, even the possibility of being “too substantive”
for the REA should mean that preclusion is “substantive” for Erie
purposes as well.144 That means that, under the RDA, the federal
courts should follow state law. The invisible footnote of a diversity
judgment would contain state law, and the preclusive effect of the
judgment of a federal court sitting in diversity would be governed by
the preclusion law of the state that provided the substantive law.
And indeed, the Court initially suggested that this outcome
would be required, for it stated that applying the federal Rule would
“in many cases violate the federalism principles of Erie ….”145
Citing Hanna, Guaranty Trust, and Walker v. Armco Steel,146 the
Court argued that giving force to the federal rule would result in
substantial variation in outcomes between state and federal court,
leading to the inequities and forum shopping that the “twin aims” test
is meant to prevent.147 So far, preclusion sounds substantive for Erie
purposes, and substantive enough for REA purposes that a Rule
treading the ground of preclusion should be drained of life. This
analysis ought to mean that the federal courts are required by the
RDA to follow state law.
In the second half of Semtek, however, the Court reversed
course, deciding that the preclusive effect of diversity judgments

but it is not the most natural reading of the opinion, which speaks as if to questions
of preclusion generally.
144
In other words, the set of legal rules that are “procedural” for RDA purposes is
a wholly contained subset of the set of legal rules that are “procedural” for REA
purposes.
145
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 504.
146
446 U.S. 740 (1980).
147
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 504.
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would instead be governed by federal common law.148 As support,
the Court cited cases suggesting that federal law controlled the
preclusive effect of federal judgments, but it conflated federal
question cases with diversity cases and conflated the obligation to
give full faith and credit to federal judgments with the determination
of what such faith required.149 The Court also relied on a pre-REA
case that it had already said no longer controlled.150 The justification
for making federal common law takes up barely more than a page in
the United States Reports, and nowhere does it identify the source of
the Court’s authority.151
Commentators have suggested that Semtek was based on the
Supreme Court’s inherent authority to govern procedural matters in
the federal courts.152 Although the Court is generally obliged to
follow congressional commands even in the realm of procedure, it is
usually thought to be free to develop rules of practice and procedure,
in the absence of congressional action or a governing Rule.153 Its
authority to do so comes either from Article III’s establishment of
the judicial branch or from Congress’s creation of lower courts and
conferral of jurisdiction to decide cases.154 The problem with relying
148

Semtek, 531 U.S. at 507-08.
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 507 (citing cases).
150
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 507-08 (discussing Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 130 (1874)).
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Semtek, 531 U.S. at 507-09.
152
See Woolley, supra note 90, at 537 (“While the court did not identify the source
of authority for a federal common law of preclusion, it would appear that statutes
creating the federal courts and bestowing jurisdiction upon them provide an
adequate basis—albeit and implicit one—for the development of common law
rules in this area.”).
153
Joseph J. Anclien, Broader Is Better: The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts,
64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L., 37, 41 (2008) (describing the predominant view
that inherent powers exist only in “cases of indispensable necessity” and arguing
for a broader view); Robert J. Pushaw, The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and
the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 743 (2001) (“As the early
Justices recognized but the modern Court has forgotten, the Necessary and Proper
Clause authorizes Congress alone to determine whether or not to bestow beneficial
powers.”).
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Barrett, supra note 14 (discussing the implications of these two lines of
authority).
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on this inherent power to explain Semtek is that before turning to the
inherent power, the Semtek Court had strongly suggested that the
matter at issue was substantive under both the REA and the RDA.155
Of course, the location of the substance–procedure line may vary
according to the legal context, and we have already said that it is
different for the REA than for the RDA. The line could certainly lie
in yet another location for purposes of inherent power. However, if
preclusion is substantive for REA and RDA purposes, but procedural
for inherent power purposes, then the realm of inherent power is
larger than the realm that can be governed by Rules promulgated
under the REA. This scheme seems unlikely. The Supreme Court has
already interpreted the REA to permit any rule that “really regulates
procedure.”156 This generous standard reflects the reality that
Congress’s blessing in the REA enhances the Court’s inherent
power. Just as in the Steel Seizure Cases,157 the powers belonging to
one branch of government are at their strongest when that branch
acts in concert with another branch.158 The Court’s inherent power to
make procedural law should not exceed its power to do the same
when buttressed by congressional authority.159 As Elizabeth Lear has
explained,
155

Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503-04.
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Insur. Co., _ U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 1431,
1444 (2010) (adhering to this standard).
157
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Swayer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (“When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that
he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.”).
158
Cf. Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CAL. L. REV. 595, 598-99 (2008)
(“Federal common law could be analogized to Justice Jackson’s discussion of
presidential authority in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. Jackson’s
opinion explains the basic interaction between Congress and a branch with largely
derivative constitutional authority. I suggest that those dynamics work similarly
whether one considers Congress and the President (Youngstown), or Congress and
the Judiciary (federal common law).”).
159
Cf. Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non
Conveniens: Friction on the Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 1147,
1184 (2006) (“[I]t would be very odd indeed if the Court could evade this
restriction simply by relying on its inherent power…. The Rules of Decision Act
represents the congressional vision of the appropriate balance between state law
and inherent power lawmaking by the federal courts.”).
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The Rules Enabling Act and the Rules of Decision Act are
… relevant to the scope of the Court's inherent power,
representing efforts by Congress to minimize friction
between the federal courts and Congress, and the federal
courts and the States, respectively. Together they form the
outer limits of judicial innovation on the procedural front.
… While Congress may enact substantive or procedural
statutes that displace the substantive law of the States, the
Rules of Decision Act prohibits the Court from doing so
under the guise of the inherent power.160
For these reasons, the realm of inherent power should be a subset of
the realm of the REA. If preclusion is substantive for RDA purposes,
either the Federal Rule validly applies and controls, or else state law
controls. Depending on whether the Semtek Court was correct in the
first half of its opinion (calling preclusion substantive, for both REA
and RDA purposes) or the second half (treating it as procedural),
either the Court wrongly displaced the states’ substantive authority
or it wrongly ignored, through convoluted interpretation, its own
prior promulgation of Rule 41(b).
There are two defenses that one could make of the Court’s
analysis in Semtek, but each ultimately fails. First, perhaps my
conception of the spectrum from substance to procedure is
misleadingly linear. I have suggested that matters of “procedure”
under the RDA and inherent powers must be wholly contained
subsets of matters that are “procedural” under the REA. Perhaps,
however, the relationships among the RDA, the REA, and inherent
160

Lear, supra note 159, at 1180-81; see also Wendy Collins Perdue, The Sources
and Scope of Federal Procedural Common Law: Some Reflections on Erie and
Gasperini, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 751, 760 (1998) (“The Rules Enabling Act may
constrain courts, even where they are not directly interpreting a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure but are instead creating a federal common law rule of ‘practice and
procedure.’ As Professors Westen and Lehman argue, ‘the statutory prohibition on
rules that abridge “substantive rights” must be deemed to apply to judge-made
rules too; otherwise, judges could do through common law adjudication what they
cannot do through the carefully circumscribed and safeguarded mechanisms used
to create the federal rule of civil procedure.’”).
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power are multidimensional. There might then be a way to justify the
Court’s use of inherent power along a different axis. Second, perhaps
preclusion truly is substantive: Semtek is justified not by the Court’s
inherent power over procedure but by substantive power to make
federal common law.
The first defense would draw on the long-neglected part (b) of
§ 2072, which prohibits a Federal Rule from abridging, enlarging, or
modifying a substantive right.161 Commentators have long
complained that the Court’s “really regulates procedure” test for
validity under the REA implements only § 2072(a), authorizing the
Court to promulgate rules of practice and procedure.162 Many believe
that some further constraint is needed in order to fulfill § 2072(b)’s
command not to alter substantive rights.163 Preclusion is a classic
example of a body of law that is “procedural” in a sense but can also
reasonably be understood to alter substantive rights.164 It might then
validly lie within the Court’s inherent power over procedure while
still being “too substantive” for the REA.
The problem with this first defense of Semtek is the RDA.
Surely, if preclusion law alters substantive rights, it is substantive not
just under the REA but also under Erie/Hanna/RDA. The RDA thus
directs the federal courts to apply state law. The Semtek decision
does not demonstrate that state law does not “apply,” and thus
control, under the terms of the RDA. Analogy to Justice Jackson’s
Steel Seizure framework is again useful here165: While the Court’s
power over procedure is at its maximum when it acts in conjunction
with Congress, as under the REA, the Court’s power is minimal
161

28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
See, e.g., Ely, supra note 1, at 719-20; Kelleher, supra note 112, at 48
(collecting citations);.
163
Or that the two together should have more teeth than the “really regulates
procedure” test has exhibited. See Burbank, The REA, supra note 112, at 1108
(arguing that § 2072(b) does not have independent effect distinct from the effect of
§ 2072(a) but that the Court’s approach since Sibbach is too lenient).
164
See Barrett, supra note 14, at 830-31 (treating preclusion as a matter of
procedural common law but noting that its “status as ‘procedural’ is … open to
doubt”).
165
See supra, note 149 (discussing Steel Seizure).
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when it acts contrary to congressional command.166 The adoption of
federal common law contrary to Congress’s policy of following state
law can be justified under the inherent power only to protect the core
ability of the federal courts to perform their judicial function.167 That
is a heavy burden, which the Semtek Court did not attempt to meet.
Similarly, any legal rule that would be deemed “procedural” for
Erie/RDA purposes is also sufficiently procedural to be within the
scope of the REA.168 A matter cannot be “too substantive” for the
REA yet within the scope of inherent power. The first defense
therefore fails.
The second defense is that preclusion is, indeed, substantive for
most or all purposes, and that the authority claimed in Semtek was
not the inherent power over procedure but common law-making
power such as the Court exercises over maritime law or suits to
which the United States is a party.169 In order to make federal
common law, however, the Court is supposed to identify the federal
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See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President takes measures incompatible with
the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then
he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter.”).
167
See supra, part II.B.1 (discussing the scope of inherent power relative to power
under the REA).
168
This discussion assumes that a Federal Rule is either valid or invalid under the
REA, ignoring the possibility that a Rule might be generally valid but invalid as
applied to displace a particular state practice that serves substantive goals. See
infra part II.C. (discussing reasons why Rules should not be invalidated as
applied). The issue of as-applied invalidity was not at play in Semtek since the case
involved the general rules of what preclusion laws should apply, not a state’s
idiosyncratic use of matters ordinarily deemed procedural to achieve a substantive
policy goal.
169
See Barrett, supra note 14, at 831-32 (“In Semtek, the Supreme Court hinted
that its power to formulate federal rules of preclusion rests on the same ground as
its power to formulate substantive common law: the lack of congressional guidance
in an area of clearly federal concern.”). However, Barrett also points out that the
Court did not elaborate on this justification in Semtek and that its other preclusion
cases have been silent on the source of power. Id. at 832.
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interest that is at stake.170 There are two federal interests that are
potentially at stake in the preclusive effect of a diversity judgment:
First, there is an interest in ensuring that federal judgments receive
full faith and credit. It is not apparent, however, that this interest
extends any further than ensuring that the diversity judgment
receives the same respect that would be accorded to a state court
judgment. Second, there is a federal interest in the conduct of the
initial litigation, which will be affected by the anticipated preclusive
effects of the judgment.171 That, however, is a procedural interest,
and to justify federal common law on that basis without invoking the
federal courts’ power to regulate their own proceedings would be too
fine a cut.
The Semtek Court did describe one situation in which such a
federal procedural interest would exist and would require a federal
rule to control preclusive effect.172 That one situation was the
possibility that a state’s courts might not give preclusive effect to
dismissal as a sanction.173 This policy would conflict with a federal
court’s interest in making its sanction stick. The Semtek Court
seemed to fear that, having intimated that preclusion was substantive
under the REA and flat-out stated that it was substantive under Erie,
it would be forced to live with the whims of states that impose only
ineffective sanctions on misbehaving litigants. This example is an
unconvincing basis for replacing state preclusion law with federal
common law if preclusion is, indeed, properly understood as
substantive for REA and RDA purposes. State courts, like federal
courts, prefer their sanctions to be meaningful, so it seems unlikely
that a state would adopt such a self-defeating policy as the Semtek
Court imagined. Moreover, there is no need to contort either
preclusion law or Erie doctrine to deal with that slight possibility. A
federal court certainly has the power to deprive a misbehaving party
of property as a sanction, whether that property takes the form of
170

See Barrett, supra note 14, at 832 (identifying the grounds for judicial power to
formulate substantive common law).
171
Erichson, supra note 138, at 1002-03 (discussing the forum’s interest in the the
preclusion rules that would later be applied to a judgment).
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Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 (2001).
173
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 509.
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cash or a cause of action.174 That hardly means that that we need a
federal common law of property. Moreover, Byrd already permits
case-by-case balancing of state and federal interests, so that a matter
that would otherwise be controlled by state law can be federalized
because of compelling federal concerns in a particular situation.175 If
the Supreme Court truly believes that preclusion is an otherwise
substantive matter, the dismissal-as-sanction example at best
warrants federal common law only as an exception, not as the
general rule.
The outcome reached in Semtek has intuitive appeal: preclusion
has a substantive feel, especially in the context of a statute-oflimitations dismissal, yet an equally strong intuition says that federal
courts must retain control over the enforcement of their judgments.
As discussed below, these concerns could be addressed without the
free-wheeling approach to judicial authority on display in Semtek.176
The Supreme Court should not shake off the yoke of the REA by
hinting that a matter is substantive while simultaneously claiming
inherent procedural authority to regulate the matter on its own.
2. The Trouble With Gasperini: The RDA Does Not
Authorize a Body of Federal Common Law.
Other than the Supreme Court’s inherent power over procedure,
there is only one possible source of authority for making a federal
common law of preclusion for diversity cases. It is also the only
available source of authority for making a federal common law of
New York tort damages in Gasperini. That source is the RDA itself.
The point of Erie, however, was that neither the RDA nor any other
174

See Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 52 (1991) (holding that Erie did not
prevent a federal court from using its inherent power to sanction a litigant, even
where the state court might not have imposed a similar sanction).
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See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958) (allowing
courts to balance Erie concerns against countervailing federal interests); cf.
Woolley, supra note 90 (arguing that even under Semtek, most preclusion
questions will be governed by federal law because the federal interest will
predominate).
176
See infra, part II.C.
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provision of federal law authorizes federal courts to create general
common law.177 To the extent that the Gasperini Court perceived
itself as creatively accommodating state law to the requirements of
federal constitutional procedure, it reached beyond its authority, as it
did in Semtek.
Congress’s grant of diversity jurisdiction to the federal courts
could, in theory, be understood to include a grant of lawmaking
power.178 In the course of hearing common law claims, the federal
courts would make the law to apply to those claims. However, the
RDA, as interpreted in Erie, rejects that approach.179 Rather than
authorizing federal courts to make substantive law, it directs them to
take the applicable state law as they find it.
In Gasperini, the Court behaved as if it were trapped between the
RDA’s command that it follow the state’s substantive policy and the
Seventh Amendment’s demand to respect the jury’s verdict. In a conflict
between a state statute and the Constitution, it is clear which one prevails.
Nonetheless, the Court responded to the force of Erie policy by seeking
out a resolution that would enforce state policy without offending the
Seventh Amendment, perhaps distorting its Seventh Amendment analysis
to get there.180 The RDA, however, says that the federal courts should
follow state law, where it applies, not that they should devise new laws in
order to serve the policy goals they believe to have been articulated by the
states. The Court’s freelancing in Gasperini took it exactly where Erie
meant it should not go: rather than simply apply state law, the Court had to
discern what policies New York legislators meant to pursue, balance those
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Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
HARV. L. REV. 881, 915-16 (1986) (noting this possibility and its rejection in Erie);
Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U.
L. REV. 585, 623 (2006) (noting that Semtek involved federal common lawmaking
based solely on the existence of diversity jurisdiction).
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See Field, supra note 169, at 915-16.
180
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 629 (2000)
(sharply criticizing Gasperini’s treatment of the Seventh Amendment, calling it
“aberrant” and not worthy of deference as a matter of stare decisis).
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state policies with federal interests, and devise a practice that the Court
believed would appropriately accommodate those interests.181
Like in Semtek, in Gasperini the Court took upon itself the
authority to formulate the law that would apply to a diversity case. In
Semtek, the Court appears to have done so on the basis of its inherent
powers. As shown in Part II.A., however, inherent powers were
unavailable in light of the Court’s rationale for rejecting the
applicability of Rule 41(b). In Gasperini, the Court did not explain
why it could develop policy to accommodate state interests, rather
than simply apply (or not apply) state law. The RDA rejects such a
role for the federal courts in diversity. In both Semtek and Gasperini,
the Court’s approache was justified in the name of accommodating
state substantive policy but resulted in discretionary, policy-making
authority accruing in the federal courts.182
C. The REA and the Scope of State Legislative Authority
In Semtek and Gasperini, the Supreme Court seemed to see itself
as serving the goals of Erie and the RDA by accommodating state
law, yet retaining federal supremacy where necessary. In this Part, I
argue that the Court’s good intentions toward the states were
misplaced. Its efforts to forge creative compromises between state
and federal practices greatly magnify judicial discretion, which is
contrary to both the federalism and the separation of powers aspects
of Erie and the REA. Moreover, the Court’s justification for
increasing its own discretion—greater accommodation of state law—
is flawed. Paradoxically, federalism and respect for state authority
over substantive law could be equally well served by a wholesale
181

As noted above, this description of Gasperini is based on the summary
paragraph at the beginning of the opinion and the presentation of the case in most
commentary. See supra note 77. A better approach, which the Court mya have had
in mind but which it did not clearly express, is described infra, Part III.C.
182
See generally Laura E. Little, Empowerment Through Restraint: Reverse
Preemption or Hybrid Lawmaking, 59 CASE WESTERN L. REV. _ (forthcoming
2011) (draft on file) (demonstrating that apparent deference to state law can
“empower a strong federal judiciary” and highlighting the opportunities thereby
created for hybrid lawmaking, especially the incorporation of principles of
international law).
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approach that adheres to valid federal Rules regardless of the states’
idiosyncratic use of procedure to serve substantive goals. This is so
because a uniformly applied set of Federal Rules would put state
lawmakers on notice of the procedures to be used in diversity cases
and allow them to formulate their substantive law accordingly. This
approach would have the beneficial effect of increasing democratic
transparency in the states.
1.

Echoes of the First Two Phases

The Court’s choice-of-law decisions in Phase Three echo some
of the themes from Phases One and Two, and are thus subject to the
same critiques. While Phase Two had its excesses, its conceptual
framework was sound; part of the problem with Phase Three is the
re-introduction of mistakes from Phase One. The Court should
abandon these mistakes and return to a moderated version of Phase
Two.
Before Hanna, the Supreme Court inaugurated the practice of
adopting implausibly narrow readings of Federal Rules in order to
apply state law instead.183 This practice has returned in Phase
Three.184 The practice is especially pernicious when a more natural
reading of the Rule continues to be applied in federal question cases,
so that the same language in the same Rule means two different
things, depending on the basis for federal jurisdiction. Even Justice
Stevens’s “retail” approach in Shady Grove would be an
improvement, if it entailed frank acknowledgement that the Rule was
being found invalid as-applied, rather than disingenuously
distorted.185
This conceptual improvement, however, would not solve the
problem of excessive discretion by the federal courts. The retail
approach means having federal judges decide in every case whether a
state’s true motive for its law is substantive or procedural, a more
183

See, e.g., Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
See supra, parts I.C.2 and I.C.3 (discussing Semtek and Shady Grove).
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See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Insur. Co., _ U.S. _, 130 S.Ct.
1431, 1448 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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difficult task than the already-difficult one of classifying an actual
rule or law as such. Each case would also involve a Byrd-like
weighing of the strength of those state interests, as compared to any
federal interests at stake.186 In contrast, the approach of the Shady
Grove plurality could mark the end of Phase Three and a return to
the conceptual structure of Phase Two, although ideally with a less
aggressive approach to defining the sweep of Federal Rules. As
discussed below, this return would best be served by taking the
wholesale, rather than the retail, approach to the Rules themselves.
2.

Separating Substance and Procedure to Improve State
Lawmaking

While Phase Two may have gone too far, it was conceptually
the right approach, and the Shady Grove plurality is right about how
the validity of Rules should be evaluated. Many of the pros and cons
of the “wholesale” and “retail” approaches have been debated
elsewhere.187 Here, I focus on one argument for the “wholesale”
approach that has been neglected and that directly answers one of the
main concerns of those on the “retail” side.
A primary theoretical argument on the retail side is respect for
democratic enactments in the states. In this section, I show that
adhering to federal procedures can be beneficial to state-level
democracy, because it forces state lawmakers to make their policy
preferences clear through the substantive law, rather than masking
preferences through specialized procedure. This justification for
wholesale, rather than retail, federal procedure gains support from
the observations of several theorists who have, from a variety of
186

This is not to say that Byrd should be abandoned in the unguided Erie context,
or that Byrd-like concerns cannot be relevant even in the REA context. See Freer &
Arthur, supra note 34, at 102 (arguing that the policies reflected in Byrd pervade
both RDA and REA analysis). Rather, it is to suggest that federal courts should not
have to engage in Byrd-like balancing every time they apply a Federal Rule in a
diversity case, where local practice would differ.
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See Ely, supra note 1, at 733-34 (outlining and endorsing the retail approach);
Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1440-47 (endorsing the wholesale approach and
criticizing the retail approach used by the dissent and concurrence).
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perspectives, analyzed the relationship between substance and
procedure in light of democratic norms.188 Moreover, at least in
recent years, this justification is consistent with congressional action
manifesting a desire to maintain the federal courts as a procedurally
independent forum for litigating state law claims.189
A wholesale approach to the Federal Rules has the potential to
improve state lawmaking by forcing state lawmakers to be more
open and transparent with respect to substantive goals. The fact that
state law claims will be adjudicated under federal procedures reduces
the ability of state lawmakers to say, with Representative Dingell,
““I’ll let you write the substance ... you let me write the procedure,
and I’ll screw you every time.”190 Dingell’s statement reflects the
fact that a substantive goal can easily be undermined by imposing
procedural hurdles. Substantive entitlements are visible to the public
when it assesses the government’s work, while procedural
mechanisms are more arcane, difficult to understand, and usually
trans-substantive. When lawmakers tinker with procedure on a
substance-specific basis, they often do so in order to modify
substantive rights de facto, even if the substantive right remains
formally unchanged.
Many will regard the lawmaker’s ability to fine-tune substantive
rights through procedural mechanisms as a good thing. Legislatures
retain ultimate control over many aspects of procedure in part
because of the close connection between substance and procedure.
188

See infra, text accompanying notes 182-206.
See infra, text accompanying notes 217-20.
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Regulatory Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 2327. Before the Subcomm. on
Admin. Law and Governmental Regulations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
98th Cong. 312 (1983) (statement of Rep. John Dingell). In many states, state
lawmakers may be less sophisticated than Congress in their ability to manipulate
substance through procedure. Many state legislatures are part0time and lack the
staff and other resources to carry through on a boast like Representative Dingell’s.
That reality, however, strengthens the argument made in the text. State legislators
who lack such resources are more vulnerable to the influence of lobbying and may
support seemingly innocuous procedural reforms without realizing their
substantive effects. The lawmakers themselves may be in the same position as the
general public when it comes to the opaqueness of procedure.
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Indeed, the notion of a dichotomy between the two categories is
relatively recent.191 Nonetheless, that dichotomy now lies at the root
of the litigation framework that has been created by Congress and
that is contemplated by diversity jurisdiction, the RDA as interpreted
in Erie and its progeny, and the REA. My argument here is that
dichotomy is not necessarily a usurpation of state legislative
prerogatives but instead can enhance the democratic legitimacy of
state substantive law. While substance and procedure may be
inextricably intertwined, there is still value in trying to separate
them.
Other commentators have argued that separating substance from
procedure can promote democratic values.192 Their analyses have
focused on concerns that some of the Federal Rules are “too
substantive” and thus improperly alter substantive rights under state
and federal law alike.193 This Article takes no position on where the
substance–procedure line should be drawn for purposes of the REA,
except that the line should be drawn wholesale rather than retail.
However, the democratic problems created by an over-reaching
judiciary that uses procedure improperly to affect substance are
similar in kind to those of a legislature that does the same. The same
theoretical points thus support the idea that adherence to the Federal
Rules in federal court is no insult to the democratic processes or
lawmaking authority of the states.
Martin Redish’s work contains the most explicit and extensive
discussion of the democratic implications of manipulating procedure
in order to affect substance in the context of purely federal law.194
191

Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U.
L. REV. 801, 804-10 (2010) (describing how the concept of substance and
procedure as a dichotomy emerged along with the convergence of law and equity
and coincided with the early development of courts in the United States).
192
See infra, text accompanying notes 194-208, 212-18 (discussing work by
Martin Redish and JoEllen Lind).
193
See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty:
Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. L.
F. 71 (hereinafter Redish, Class Actions); Lind, supra note 28.
194
See Redish, Class Actions, supra note 181; Martin H. Redish & Christopher R.
Pudelski, Legislative Deception, Separation of Powers, and the Democratic
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Redish argues that a legislature has a duty to be forthright about the
substantive rights it enacts into law. As part of that duty, the
legislature cannot create opaque procedural requirements that in
effect undermine the rights proclaimed by the substantive law:
For example, in formally adopting “standard A” as a
general rule of decision, while simultaneously requiring the
federal courts to reach decisions that effectively amount to
adoption of “standard B” or “standard ‘not A,”’ Congress
has substantially subverted the representational democratic
process.195
Redish argues that this sort of legislative deception could violate
both the procedural due process rights of litigants and the separation
of powers.196
An example where procedural rights might be violated is
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Deborah Brake and Joanna
Grossman have demonstrated that the remedial scheme established
under Title VII is so burdensome on claimants, so unforgiving about
its short deadlines, and so poorly designed as a response to the reallife experience of discrimination, that Congress has failed to protect
the substantive rights purportedly created by Title VII.197 While
Congress may not have been under a duty to create those substantive
rights, it claims to have created them and reaps the political benefit
of having done so. If it has encumbered those substantive rights with
such a defective enforcement mechanism that they effectively do not
Process: Harnessing the Political Theory of United States v. Klein, 100 NW. U. L.
REV. 437 (2006) (hereinafter Redish & Pudelski, Legislative Deception); Martin H.
Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political Perspectives,
46 MERCER L. REV. 697 (1995) (hereinafter Redish, Federal Judicial
Independence).
195
Redish, Federal Judicial Independence, supra note 194, at 715-16.
196
Redish, Federal Judicial Independence, supra note 194, at 716.
197
Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a RightsClaiming System, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 859 (2008). That Brake & Grossman’s thesis is
an example of Redish’s point is pointed out in Howard M. Wasserman,
Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on a Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L.
REV. 1547, 1557-58 (2008).
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exist for a substantial portion of people, then perhaps, under Redish’s
theory, Congress has violated the due process clause by purporting to
create a substantive right but then making it overly burdensome to
vindicate that right.
Separation of powers is a more salient concern when Congress
forces the courts to employ Orwellian double-speak. Redish, with
Christopher Pudelski, argues that the Supreme Court implicitly
recognized this problem in United States v. Klein.198 Klein involved
the ability of southerners to reclaim property lost during the Civil
War.199 To prevail, a claimant had to have remained loyal to the
United States.200 The Supreme Court had held that receipt of a
presidential pardon constituted proof of loyalty.201 Congress had
sought to reverse that presumption, declaring that a pardon should
instead be taken as proof of disloyalty.202 In Klein, the Supreme
Court struck down the presumption, but the precise reason for doing
so is not clear from the opinion. The statute drew into question not
only the independence of the judiciary in determining the evidentiary
significance of a particular fact but also the scope of the president’s
pardon power.203 Redish and Pudelski make a convincing argument
that concerns about legislative deception were part of the mix.204
Redish has argued that the same concerns should have led to a
different outcome in Michael H. v. Gerald G., in which the Supreme
Court upheld California’s marital presumption of paternity, rejecting
the parental claims of the genetic father in favor of the mother’s
husband.205 Having promised the public that “loyal” southerners
would reclaim their property and that “fathers” would have legal
rights as parents, the legislature could not require the courts to make
a mockery of language by following presumptions that forced the
opposite conclusions. Redish argues, “Under separation-of-powers
198

80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872), discussed in Redish & Pudelski, Legislative
Deception, supra note 194.
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Klein, 80 U.S. at 135.
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Klein, 80 U.S. at 137.
201
Klein, 80 U.S. at 143-44.
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Klein, 80 U.S. at 145.
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Klein, 80 U.S. at 148.
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Redish& Pudelski, Legislative Deception, supra note 194, at 447-51.
205
Redish, Federal Judicial Independence, supra note 194, at 716-17.
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principles, this congressional action is defective, because it
effectively enlists the federal judiciary in a scheme to bring about
voter confusion.”206
Redish’s argument is a difficult one where the deceptive
procedural requirement is created by the same legislature that has
power over the substantive law. Even opaque procedural statutes are
public and open to inspection. And lawyers, at least, are accustomed
to the occasional counter-intuitive presumption or definition. If
“substance” and “procedure” are merely labels that attach to
conclusions, why not “father” and “loyal”? Moreover, in each of
Redish’s examples, the legislative presumption is reasonably
defensible. Pardons are usually granted to people who have, in fact,
done something wrong, and an admission of guilt is sometimes
required. Congress may have been justifiably outraged that pardons
were being used to deem people “loyal” for purposes of its
compensation scheme. Similarly, marriage to a child’s mother has
historically been the crux of legal and social fatherhood.207 The
marital presumption in Michael H. could be mocked only because of
fairly recent technology allowing for the identification of a genetic
father. It is difficult to know when a legislative presumption would
become so absurd that it would violate the separation of powers to
force the courts to speak in the legislature’s terms.
Redish acknowledges that it would be difficult to say when a
procedural statute goes so far in deceiving the public about the
substantive content of the law that a court should strike it down.208
For purposes of my claim, however, that line need not be drawn. I do
206

Redish, Federal Judicial Independence, supra note 194, at 716.
Nancy E. Dowd, From Genes, Marriage and Money to Nurture: Redefining
Fatherhood, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 132, 132 (2003) (“Largely in the name of
gender equality and to some extent in the name of children’s rights, we have
moved from a legal definition of fatherhood linked to marriage towards a legal
definition of fatherhood linked to genes.”).
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Redish& Pudelski, Legislative Deception, supra note 194, at 457-58 (describing
five difficult questions about the model of legislative deception, including “[I]f it is
conceded that all procedural and evidentiary rules may in some sense impact the
substantive rights being enforced, why disapprove of such a connection only in
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not suggest that state laws be struck down as unconstitutional for
intermingling substance and procedure. Rather, I argue that federal
courts should recognize that adhering to a uniform system of federal
procedure can benefit democratic process in the states, even when
displacing state procedure affects substantive outcomes. Protecting
procedure from the legislature prevents lawmakers from engaging in
the sort of deception that Redish criticizes.
In a similar vein, Linda Mullenix has argued that maintaining
independent procedures Is necessary for a well-functioning
independent judiciary.209 Her focus was on Congress’s increasingly
frequent interventions in federal procedure in the last thirty years.210
Mullenix decries the resulting politicization of federal procedure as it
is created through legislative rather than judicial institutions.211 The
same phenomenon can occur at the state level. If it does, state courts,
drawing on either Redish’s or Mullenix’s ideas, might decide that
their prerogatives have been invaded and strike down excessive
legislative interference with procedure as a matter of state separation
of powers. Even without such drastic action, however, the existence
of federal diversity jurisdiction can check the ability of state
legislators to manipulate substance through procedure.
Redish’s theory described above is concerned with legislators
using procedure to subvert substance. Redish and others have also
expressed concern about judges doing the same thing.212 JoEllen
Lind terms this phenomenon “procedural Swift” and accuses the
federal courts, jointly with Congress, of manipulating procedure to
undermine state substantive law.213 Redish has also argued that
209

Linda M. Mullenix, Judicial Power and the REA, 46 MERCER L. REV. 733, 734
(1995) (“A judiciary that cannot create its own procedural rules is not an
independent judiciary.”).
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Mullenix, supra note 209, at 735-36.
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Mullenix, supra note 209, at 754-55.
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See, e.g., Redish, Federal Judicial Independence, supra note 194; Lind, supra
note 28; Lear, supra note 159, at 1152 (“This Article takes the position that the
Court must abandon the forum non conveniens doctrine as an unconstitutional
usurpation of congressional power.”).
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Lind, supra note 28, at 719 (“Procedural Swift … is the strategy of creating
federal tort law through the guise of regulating procedure.”).
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courts wrongly use procedure to transform substantive law.214
Interestingly, Lind and Redish both point to class action procedure as
a prime example, but with opposite perspectives. Lind argues that the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005215 and stringent federal standards
for certification permit defendants to remove to federal court and
thereby avoid legitimate enforcement of state law through class
mechanisms.216 Congress, she argues, should not “use complex
litigation to hide law reform that could not gain public approval if its
consequences were better known.”217 Redish, in contrast, argues that
the judicial invention and liberalization of class actions to make
certain claims feasible that would not otherwise be brought is an
illegitimate departure from legislative expectations.218
This difference between Lind and Redish on class actions is a
matter of baselines. As David Shapiro has pointed out, the
availability or non-availability of class actions affects enforcement of
substantive law, but this fact does not tell us what the default rule
should be.219 More generally, Thomas Main argues that substantive
law is always premised on the procedural system that legislators
assume will be used to enforce it.220 Any change in procedures will
affect the balance of deterrence contemplated when the law was
enacted.221 Main concludes with two proposed solutions to the
problem of “mismatch” between procedures when a court applies
214

See Redish, Class Actions, supra note 193.
Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (making several changes to class action
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large class actions to federal court).
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foreign law. First, when a court applies foreign law, it should apply
as much of foreign law, both substantive and procedural, as possible;
legislatures, in turn, should intermingle substance with specially
tailored procedure to a greater extent than they do now. Second, at
the policy level, we should strive to harmonize procedure across
jurisdictions.222
In the domestic choice-of-law context in federal courts, both
administrative and theoretical considerations favor Main’s second
solution over his first. Administratively, federal courts should not be
required to adopt large chunks of the procedural devices of the fifty
states while simultaneously operating under the uniform federal
rules. Moreover, procedure changes over time, and fidelity to Main’s
goal of fulfilling legislative expectations would require courts to
discover and apply the procedures that existed at the time each
substantive rule was adopted. Theoretically, as discussed above,
uniform procedure requires legislatures to pursue their substantive
goals more transparently.
In addition, Main’s claim that changes in procedure wrongly
interfere with legislative expectations rests heavily on a deterrence
theory of lawmaking.223 While many lawmakers may operate from
that perspective, the public may expect the substantive law to mean
what it says in every case, not just as a matter of probabilities and
enforcement rates. Only people who have been through at least one
year of law school are likely to be comfortable answering the
question “Isn’t that illegal?” with “Yes, but nothing is meant to be
done about it.”
The approach advocated here puts some burden on state
lawmakers to be familiar with judicial procedures and perhaps even
to amend substantive law occasionally to keep pace with evolving
procedural law. As long as we are satisfied that “procedural law,” as
embodied in the Federal Rules and in the courts’ use of inherent
222

Main, supra note 191 at 838-40. Main also advises courts to be humble and
skeptical about their ability to apply foreign law. Id. at 838.
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See Main, supra note 191, at 823-25 (describing legislation as calibrated to
achieve a particular level of deterrence).
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authority, is sufficiently procedural, this is not too much to ask of
legislators. Congress unquestionably has the power to determine
federal procedure and to confer diversity jurisdiction.224 By
following uniform, trans-substantive procedure, the federal courts
may deprive state lawmakers of the ability to modify their own
substantive creations through substance-specific procedures.
Democratic theory suggests that this result may not be a bad thing.
Consider the contrary assumption that has animated the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Phase Three. In Gasperini, the
Court seemed almost to feel guilty about the existence of the Seventh
Amendment as a constraint on federal courts.225 It reasoned as if state
legislators enact their laws in a state-only bubble and the entire
burden of figuring out how to carry out their wishes in diversity
cases must fall on the federal courts. State legislators, however,
should be assumed to be aware of diversity jurisdiction, and there is
nothing wrong with expecting them to take it into account. If
Congress had considered a statute similar to the New York law at
issue in Gasperini, the Seventh Amendment would surely have been
a topic of discussion; New York legislators should have had the same
conversation.
Consider also the state laws at issue in Shady Grove. The
substantive law proclaimed that insurance companies would be liable
for a two percent penalty if they failed to pay claims in a timely
fashion.226 Perhaps, when this law was enacted, legislators and
insurers alike knew that it would rarely be enforced: the cost of
litigation would outweigh the potential recovery in individual
actions, and the state prohibition on penalty class actions would
prevent aggregation.227 The availability of class actions in federal
224

Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 91-92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring in part
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court changes that, leading to far more efficient enforcement of the
substantive right proclaimed on the face of the statute. Now, perhaps,
as a matter of regulatory policy, this outcome over-deters: it makes
insurance companies rush their payments too much, or it imposes
liability out of proportion to their moral culpability, or it makes too
many campaign contributors unhappy. If that is so, the legislature
should change the substantive law. This outcome is preferable to
keeping the same law—promising ordinary citizens that they are
protected by this penalty—but disabling the courts from enforcing it.
If the legislature says that insurance companies should pay two
percent penalties, courts are entitled to assume that the legislature
actually wants this to happen. They should adopt procedures that
achieve this result in as “just, speedy, and inexpensive” a fashion as
possible.228 Separating substance from procedure, artificial as it may
be in some senses, has the virtue of requiring the legislature to speak
as clearly as possible in the substantive law.
This separation of substance and procedure is also consistent
with congressional action from the REA to the present. Although
Congress initially recognized the importance of state substantive law
by enacting the RDA, since 1938 it has regularly expressed a
preference for independent federal procedure.229 That preference has
become so pronounced in a recent years that it prompted Geoffrey
Hazard to ask, “Has the Erie doctrine been repealed by
Congress?”230 Hazard argues that the judicial system envisioned by
Congress is best described as follows:
State law is the substantive basis of the American legal
system, displaced only selectively by federal substantive
law. The federal court system, however, provides the
premier American model of the judiciary and, as such, is
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Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 1.
Hazard, supra note 125, at 1639 (describing a “long history of interaction
between state and federal courts in which different procedures have applied and in
which federal procedure has often trumped that of the state”).
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Hazard, supra note 125, at 1629 (title).
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called upon to administer its form of justice in legal
disputes.231
In statutes like the Class Action Fairness Act, Congress has
expressed its view that, “in certain types of cases, the judicious
administration of state law is better entrusted to federal courts.”232
The dichotomy between substance and procedure may be
artificial and thus difficult to define and maintain. It is nonetheless a
dichotomy that Congress has placed at the foundation of the federal
judicial system and that serves important functions in that system. In
Erie’s Third Phase, a shifting plurality of the Supreme Court has
begun to break down that dichotomy, apparently in the name of state
democratic processes. State-level democracy, however, does not
need this solicitude. Just as the courts are frequently at pains to
ascertain and apply state substantive law, state lawmakers can
reasonably be expected to ascertain federal procedural law, and to
plan accordingly. If they do so, uniform federal procedure will not
stand in the way of their substantive goals. Moreover, state law
would gain in democratic legitimacy and transparency because
lawmakers would be prevented from manipulating procedure in ways
that undermine the apparent goals of substantive law.
III. ENDING PHASE THREE
Phase Three of Erie is characterized by discretionary lawmaking
by the federal courts. This discretion is claimed for the seemingly
self-effacing purpose of accommodating state policies. As it turns
out, however, state-level lawmaking would likely fare just as well or
better in the face of uniform federal procedure. Fortunately, Phase
Three is so far strictly a Supreme Court phenomenon, and the
decisions in Gasperini and Semtek can and should be contained. This
section sketches a plan for construing those cases narrowly and
bringing an end to Phase Three of Erie.
231

Hazard, supra note 125, at 1630.
Hazard, supra note 125, at 1629; see supra, note 203 (describing the Class
Action Fairness Act).
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A. The Third Phase Has No Traction in the Lower Courts
Lower federal courts have routinely cited Gasperini and Semtek
as the Supreme Court’s most recent articulation of Erie principles.
The lower courts have not, however, emulated the Supreme Court’s
Phase-Three approach by creating their own accommodations of
state policy. Instead, they have continued to give “yes” or “no”
answers to Erie questions. Phase Three can therefore be contained, as
a Supreme Court frolic that has not yet taken root in general federal
practice.
Lower courts are presumably more sensitive than the Supreme
Court to the dangers of inviting litigants not only to argue for or
against the application of state law but also to suggest novel
accommodations of the interests embodied in each. Perhaps for this
reason, I have found only one lower court decision that even
considered following the Phase Three strategy. In Houben v. Telular,
the Seventh Circuit reviewed the leading Erie cases in detail and then
commented, “It seems possible to us, in light of the substantive
policy … and in keeping with Gasperini’s approach, that state
substantive interests and federal procedural rules might be capable of
accommodation.”233 After a short discussion of that possibility,
however, the court concluded that the accommodation was “too
much of a strain” and decided not to apply state law at all.234 This
reluctance to follow the Gasperini path bodes well for ending the
Third Phase before it takes hold beyond the Supreme Court.
B. Containing Semtek
In Semtek, the Supreme Court may have had a legitimate reason
for creating federal common law based on its inherent power over
procedure in the federal courts. The Court, however, was not
transparent about how it got there. The best way of limiting its effect
in the future is to confine its holding to the particular circumstances
of the case—the preclusive effect of a dismissal on statute-of233
234

Houben v. Telular Corp., 309 F.3d 1028, 1038 (7th Cir. 2002).
Houben, 309 F.3d at 1039.
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limitations grounds—rather than to construe it as a general statement
about preclusion.
The most serious difficulty posed by Semtek was its suggestion
that preclusion is, as a general matter, a substantive realm that is
beyond the reach of the REA.235 Other Federal Rules regulate
matters that bear on preclusion, such as permissive and compulsory
joinder.236 If read to deal generally with preclusion, Semtek calls into
question the validity of those Rules as they are generally understood
and applied.237 Instead, Semtek should be construed as primarily a
statute of limitations case, rather than a preclusion case. At the next
opportunity, the Court could clarify that matters such as joinder,
including the preclusive effects of failing to join a compulsory claim,
are within the scope of the REA.
While this approach is, admittedly, not the best reading of the
Semtek decision, it is at least plausible. Patrick Woolley has already
shown how to “save” federal preclusion rules from Semtek using the
back door that the Court left open for ensuring the preclusive effect
of dismissal as a sanction.238 Recall Semtek’s holding: the preclusive
effect of a diversity judgment is governed by federal common law; to
determine the content of that federal common law, courts should
borrow from the preclusion law of the forum state, unless federal
interests demand a different rule.239 The stated reason for the final
caveat was the remote possibility of a state failing to accord
preclusive effect to dismissals that sanction a party.240 Woolley,
however, points out that strong federal interests are also at stake in a
235

Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 13.
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See Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 724 (Semtek “preserves the validity
of Rule 41(b), but only at the expense of casting doubt on other Federal Rules,
notably Rule 13(a) on compulsory counterclaims and Rule 23 on class actions,
which presumably determine the preclusive effect of any resulting judgment.”); but
see Burbank & Wolff, Redeeming, supra note 99, at 50 (stating that Rule 13 could
“be used to support the application of federal common law of preclusion” only if
“justified by its non-preclusion policies”).
238
Woolley, supra note 90.
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Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508-09.
240
Semtek, 531 U.S. at 509.
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variety of other aspects of the preclusion analysis, such as joinder,
whether claims are compulsory, and when a judgment becomes
final.241 Again, all of these federal interests are procedural interests,
properly governed through the REA and/or the inherent powers of
the courts. In Woolley’s assessment, only statutes of limitations and
questions of privity fail to trigger sufficient federal interests to
warrant uniform federal treatment.242
This re-reading of Semtek remains possible because the Semtek
Court did not firmly commit itself to the position that Rule 41(b)
would be invalid if construed to have preclusive effect.243 Its
suggestion of that possibility should be read in the context of a
statute of limitations analysis. Statutes of limitation have a unique
place in Erie jurisprudence. It was a statute of limitations that first
drove the Court, in Guaranty Trust, to try to articulate a test for
when state law controlled in a diversity case.244 Once established,
federal respect for state statutes of limitations contributed to the
excess of the First Phase in Ragan.245 Semtek should be seen as part
of this pattern rather than as establishing a general rule for preclusion
questions.
Under this approach, Semtek becomes the exception to a general
rule that the preclusive effect of a federal judgment is a matter of
federal procedural law. Rules of preclusion “really regulate
procedure” and are thus properly addressed in the Federal Rules.
However, a few aspects of preclusion law—statutes of limitations,
perhaps privity—are sufficiently substantive to warrant restrained
interpretation of the Rules, and are substantive for Erie purposes, so
that state law applies if the Federal Rules do not. Importantly, the
conclusion that these issues are substantive is a wholesale, not a
241

Woolley, supra note 90, at 532; see also Erichson, supra note 138, at 1003
(pointing out that “nearly all preclusion rules are transsubstantive”).
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Woolley, supra note 90, at 529, 532 (arguing that “neither the Erie policy nor
the REA prevents recognition of the very strong federal interest in uniform federal
rules of preclusion with respect to all but a handful of issues”).
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See Semtek, 531 U.S. at 506.
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retail, determination. One can say that “joinder” is properly deemed
procedural and governed by the law of the court that hears the case,
while “privity” or “statutes of limitations” are best governed by the
law-supplying state without inquiring into what laws any particular
state has adopted in these matters.246
In the alternative, the Court could adhere to the view suggested
in Semtek that preclusion is, in general, too substantive for the REA;
perhaps the Court would reach this conclusion in the course of
adopting a more rigorous approach to the REA than the “really
regulates procedure” test. The problem with Semtek, of course, is
that the Supreme Court adhered to that view only for the first half of
the opinion. To be consistent, the Court should have refrained from
claiming inherent power over a matter it had already cast as too
substantive for the REA. The Court therefore should have held that it
was bound to follow state preclusion law not by federal common law
of its own creation but by the RDA. While I believe it would be
preferable to recognize most questions of preclusion as procedural
for REA purposes,247 what is untenable is for the Court to claim
246

The one major problem not addressed by this reading of Semtek is that even the
new reading retains the dual interpretation of Rule 41(b). The Rule means little or
nothing in diversity cases but is still understood to govern preclusion in federal
question cases. The problem of duel interpretations originated in Phase Two, not in
Semtek. One way of dealing with this problem is to distinguish true interpretations
of the Rules from judicial “glosses” on the Rules, in which the courts feel in the
interstices of the Rules. A true interpretation would govern in a diversity case, but
a “gloss” might give way to state law if it were substantive for RDA purposes. See
supra, note 39 (discussing this strategy for dealing with the dual interpretation
cases). Short of flat-out overruling all the cases in which it has occurred, the best
thing that the Court can do is to just stop doing it, as it could have done in Semtek:
The most natural way to read Rule 41(b) is as a default rule for determining
whether a federal court’s judgment was intended to be on the merits. A simple way
out of the Semtek problem would have been to hold that the plaintiff should have
requested that the judgment be issued “without prejudice” because California law,
made applicable through the RDA, required as much. The district court’s refusal to
do so could have been addressed on direct appeal. The Supreme Court’s decision
in Semtek acknowledged this possible sequence of events in footnotes but oddly
suggested that the plaintiff’s failure to pursue the matter on direct appeal required
that it be dealt with in the subsequent case, rather than simply being defaulted.
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inherent procedural power while at the same time declaring the
matter beyond the reach of the REA.
C. Containing Gasperini
The flaws in Gasperini are easier to confine to the
circumstances of that case. The Gasperini Court presented the case
as if it could formulate, not merely apply or not apply, New York
law. More specifically, the Court indulged two errors in its approach.
First, the Gasperini Court forgot the original point of Erie: that state
common law rules are, like state statutes, “laws” under the RDA.
Second, faced with what it deemed a substantive New York law in
conflict with the federal Constitution, the Court should have used
ordinary severability analysis (rather than its own discretionary
balancing of state and federal interests) to determine what law to
apply.
First, the description of Gasperini in Part I.C.1, above, follows
the Court and most commentators in describing the issue as whether
the New York statute on appellate review of damages applied in
federal court. The Supreme Court concluded the statute was
sufficiently substantive to warrant application under Erie, but also
that it conflicted with the Seventh Amendment obligations of the
federal courts. To read the body of the Court’s opinion, the Syllabus,
and many other synopses of the holding, one would think that the
Supreme Court itself came up with the compromise of
accommodating state policy by having the trial court, rather than the
appellate court, perform the damages review.248

Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 717, 760 (2005) (explaining that the rendering court can have great influence
on future preclusive application of its judgment, even thought it cannot it purport
to declare the judgment’s applicability to future hypothetical cases).
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Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 419 (1996) (majority opinion)
(holding that “New York’s law … can be given effect without detriment to the
Seventh Amendment, is the review standard set out in CPLR § 5501(c) is applied
by the federal trial court judge”); id. at 415 (Syllabus by the clerk of court) (stating
the same); Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 707.
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The problem with this description is that not one but two New
York laws were relevant in Gasperini. The first was the statute,
which required damages review by appellate courts.249 Second, as
the Court briefly acknowledged in its background section but then
ignored for the rest of the opinion, the common law of New York
required damages review by trial courts under the same standard. 250
Erie says that both the statute and the common law are “laws.” 251
While the New York statute conflicted with the Seventh Amendment
and therefore could not apply in federal court, the common law did
not conflict with the Seventh Amendment and could therefore
apply.252 There was no need for creativity, accommodation, or other
interest-balancing by the Supreme Court.
Unfortunately, the Gasperini Court ignored the state’s common
law rule and treated only the statute as “law” that might apply in
federal court. 253 This raises the question: what if the common law
rule had been different? That is, New York must have some legal
standard for when a trial court can revise a jury verdict.254 If that
standard had happened to differ from the standard prescribed by
statute for appellate courts, the Supreme Court’s freelancing on how
to “accommodate” the statute would have ended up paradoxically
displacing another state law. Gasperini did not call for the Supreme
Court to make up a federal common law of New York damages
because New York already had a common law of damages.
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Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 423 n. 4 (quoting the statute).
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 425 (noting that the “deviates materially” standard, as
construed by New York’s courts, instructs state trial judges as well). Whether this
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Second, in formulating its own accommodation of the statute, the
Supreme Court neglected the ordinary task of a court faced with a law that
is constitutional in part. Once the Court determined that the New York
statute represented a substantive policy choice under Erie, the next step
was to apply the statute. Faced with a Seventh Amendment barrier, it
should have done just what a New York court would have done, if the
Seventh Amendment had the same effect in state court: asked if the statute
was entirely unconstitutional or if some part of it could be saved by a
severability analysis. The severability analysis—under New York
severability rules, of course—may well have yielded the resolution that
the Court reached on its own. Whether it did or not, the decision would
have been better because reached by the ordinary tools of statutory
interpretation rather than the Court’s own creative process. The correct
question was not “What kind of accommodation can we make between
state and federal interests?” but “What would a New York court do, faced
with this statute and a constitutional barrier to applying it in full?”
An approach that focused on statutory interpretation would also be
superior because it would have a better chance of revealing the actual
legislative intent, which is likely to bear on the initial classification of the
law as substantive or procedural. When legislatures enact tort reform
measures that implicate procedure, there is nothing wrong with expecting
them to know that state tort cases are litigated in both state and federal
courts. New laws must therefore be consistent with federal requirements
for there to be a chance that they will be fully enforced. Thus, there was
no reason for the Supreme Court to tiptoe around the inconvenient fact of
the Seventh Amendment.
There is nothing incongruous about the New York statute producing
different review procedures in state and federal cases. That difference is a
function not of the substance/procedure distinction but of the Seventh
Amendment’s status as one of a very few unincorporated rights.255 The
255

Most provisions of the first eight amendments to the federal Constitution are
incorporated against the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The restrictions on appellate review of jury verdicts that were at issue
in Gasperini are among the few exceptions. See Morris B. Hoffman, The Court
Says No to “Incorporation Rebound,” 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 818, 831-32 (2009)
(reviewing the state of incorporation at that time).
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New York legislature can anticipate the operation of the federal
Constitution in federal court just as well as it can anticipate the operation
of the state constitution in state court. Although the statute was apparently
consistent with New York constitutional requirements, there is nothing
wrong with expecting New York legislators to anticipate the Seventh
Amendment problems as well. If those legislators believed they were
enacting substantive policy that would apply in federal court, they should
have accommodated federal constitutional constraints. On the other hand,
a severability analysis grounded in legislative intent might have uncovered
that the legislature’s concern was with excessive or widely varying
verdicts in local trials presided over by local, elected judges. There may
have been little concern about federal juries under federal judges. Since
the Supreme Court saw the statute itself as sounding in both substance and
procedure, it would have been worth asking at this point whether the
legislature’s goal was to change the substantive law applied in all courts or
to correct for procedural biases in the state court system.256
It is unfortunate that the Court framed Gasperini as if its task
were to create a federal common law of New York tort damages. The
Court likely would have reached the same result by respecting New
York common law as much as it respected the New York statute, or
even by performing a severability analysis, but it would have kept
the lines of authority clear. State substantive policy should be
implemented through state law, properly interpreted, not by
unauthorized federal common law.
CONCLUSION
Semtek and Gasperini each resulted in the unwarranted exercise
of federal judicial discretion rather than a straightforward choice
between state and federal law. However, the Supreme Court’s
creative energy on Erie questions has not yet infected the lower
256

Here, I am taking as given the Gasperini Court’s conclusion that the New York
law at issue was substantive for RDA purposes and that no Federal Rule applied;
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to apply a state law conceded to be substantive, it is of course appropriate to
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approach to the validity of the Federal Rules.
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courts, and both Semtek and Gasperini can still be confined to their
fairly narrow circumstances. The split in Shady Grove indicates that
the Supreme Court remains poised between two paths: either ending
Phase Three and returning to the conceptual structure of Phase Two,
or else continuing with Phase Three’s pattern of idiosyncratic
accommodation of idiosyncratic state policies. This Article has
shown that the Phase-Three approach is unnecessary on its own
terms. The approach appears to be motivated largely by a sense that
special accommodations are necessary to protect substantive state
policy interests, the very interests that Erie itself vindicated. This
motivation is misplaced. Case-by-case modification of federal
procedural law is not necessary to protect state’s democratically
chosen policies. Rather, uniform federal procedure will allow states
to formulate substantive policy with knowledge of the procedures
through which that policy will be enforced and will encourage state
lawmakers to act openly through the substantive law rather than
manipulate outcomes with special procedures. Shady Grove should
therefore mark the end of Erie’s Third Phase.

